



Thematic Paper on
**'Improving PES effectiveness and
efficiency and the balance
between ALMP and passive
benefit reform'**

Support to EMCO Thematic Reviews
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Introduction

Increasing unemployment and tightening budgets have posed a twin challenge for Member States to improve the effectiveness of Public Employment Services (PES) and active labour market policies (ALMPs). The crisis pushed government deficit to an average of -6.5 % of GDP in the EU-27, while unemployment jumped from 7 to 9.5 % in the first year of the crisis and increased further, though at a slower pace, to 11 % by the end of 2013. Member States responded by introducing new employment policy measures or adjusting existing ones and by reshaping labour market institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to summarise the **main lessons and good practice** from the activities of the [Mutual Learning Programme](#) (MLP), [PES to PES dialogue](#) and [European Employment Policy Observatory](#) (EEPO) to assist the discussions of policymakers, more specifically members of the **Employment Committee (EMCO)**. This document focuses on PES, ALMP and Unemployment Benefit (UB) reforms and delivers the learning from a number of relevant Thematic Reviews in 2011 and 2012, Peer Reviews in 2012 and 2013 and a number of EEPO Reviews, including the latest Review Core Team Synthesis: Assessment of Labour Market Reforms 2011-2013.

Background

In the wake of the global financial crisis many Member States sought to curtail excessive job shedding through the use of temporary measures such as employment subsidies and targeted labour cost reductions, short-time working schemes and to sustain consumption by reinforcing benefit schemes. However, fiscal constraints meant that after 2010, Member States phased out these temporary measures and focus increasingly shifted to enhancing labour market flexibility and automatic stabilisers.

Reforms implemented in relation to ALMPs and UBs have tended to be more extensive in countries that were hit harder by the crisis, such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain and in some of the new Member States where additional structural reforms were taking place during and in the wake of the crisis (as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary).

Spending increased on both active and passive measures in most Member States. This also entailed a rise in the share of active measures in the Nordic countries, Germany, Belgium and some of the new Member States. While the initial temporary measures focused mainly on preventing unemployment (mainly via wage subsidies and short-time working), more recently the focus has shifted somewhat towards training programmes and in particular youth measures.

Most Member States also strived to improve PES performance and some also increased funding and staffing, although in others staffing levels have been reduced. In some cases this was implemented in parallel with reinforcing activation requirements for the unemployed. However, less emphasis was put on PES reform after 2011, with few exceptions (notably Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain).

Despite these policy efforts, employment has proved slow to recover and remained below its 2007 levels in most Member States. This has led to a build-up of long-term unemployment and an increase in poverty in several Member States. In response, several Member States made further adjustments to their UB systems, the management of PES as well as their ALMPs.

Changes in passive labour market policies

In response to the economic crisis, many European countries have taken measures to support labour market functioning and household income security.

Existing unemployment benefit (UB) arrangements have played an important role in their capacity as 'automatic stabilisers', delivering income support to households in need while providing macroeconomic stabilisation. UB automatically increase government spending and consumption and thus mitigate fluctuations in the economy. Thanks to the job-search requirements attached to the receipt of benefits, UB can also help job seekers find the position most suited to their abilities, thus making the worker-employer match more effective.

However, there are some potential risks linked to generous unemployment benefits which can keep the reservation wage higher than optimal and increase the period of unemployment. There is some evidence which indicates that increasing UB generosity has an impact on slowing down job finding for the eligible population. However, such effects are modest and the link with overall unemployment is not clearly established. Financial incentives through the UB system have been shown to have the clearest effect on decisions on whether or not to work at all (rather than on the hours worked). These effects are particularly strong among women and low-income groups. The discussion paper¹ prepared for the MLP [Thematic Review Seminar on 'Tackling Long Term Unemployment - effective strategies and tools to address long-term unemployment'](#) argues that there is a risk to limiting UB entitlements, as it might discourage PES registration and therefore have a negative impact on job finding.

Potential adverse effects of the UB system could be mitigated by adjusting the rules of entitlement and generosity of benefits, hence impacting on people's behaviour. However, finding the right balance for the UB system in terms of poverty prevention and incentives to re-enter the labour market depends to a large extent on the national context and policy background.

Most Member States reacted to the rise in unemployment with a slight increase in the overall generosity of the UB system to adapt it to the changes in the economic cycle.

The required minimum contribution period to be eligible to receive UB was left unchanged in most Member States during the crisis as it was already relatively short. Exceptions include Estonia (increase of the minimum contribution period), France, Latvia and Portugal (decrease).

Changes mainly concerned the maximum duration of UB entitlement as well as the level of payments.

In 2008, the mean maximum benefit duration was 12 months in the EU and the shortest duration was 5 months (Cyprus, Malta) or 6 months (Czech Republic, the UK).

¹ European Commission, Discussion paper on Reforms of the benefit system to make work pay: Options and priorities in a weak labour market, Brussels, Author: Herwig Immervoll, in collaboration with ICF GHK

Following the start of the crisis, Latvia and Romania increased the maximum duration of payments reflecting the increased average length of unemployment.

Conversely, a few Member States made moderate cuts to the maximum duration (Denmark to 24 months, Greece and Portugal² to 12 and 11 months respectively and the Czech Republic from 6 to 5 months) while Hungary cut it to 3 months in 2011.

Benefit reform in Latvia The economic crisis was severe in Latvia, with unemployment doubling between 2008 and 2011. The share of registered unemployed persons not receiving UB increased from 43% in 2008 to 76% in 2011. In order to alleviate the rise of exclusion and poverty, in July 2009 the government decided to extend the social safety net by increasing and widening coverage and implementing new measures. They increased the maximum duration of insured unemployment benefit to 9 months (from between 4 to 9 months) regardless of prior contributions and reduced the minimum contribution period from 12 to 9 months.

In September 2009, the Latvian Ministry also introduced an Emergency Public Works programme, which offered six-month placements in community jobs. 100,200 people have since participated in the programme, the majority of whom have been middle-aged and from a vocational education background. Overall, the programme has proved very successful: 91% of the participants have reported improved working skills and 96% an increased ability to work in a permanent job.

A [Peer Review organised in Latvia](#) on the subject emphasised that Public Works programmes should be implemented without 'contradicting' the existing welfare state. With this in mind, these programmes should be temporary and should not outlive their necessity in order to avoid benefit traps. However, there can be a role for 'public works' post-crisis, in a better performing economy, as long as they are properly targeted; aimed at those who need supported employment (thereby achieving social inclusion aims) and complement other support measures.

The level of UB was cut in Greece and Spain, under the pressure of fiscal constraints. Other Member States sought to maintain UB levels in order to sustain consumption and prevent the rise of poverty.

Job search requirements and conditionality of UB were strengthened in the past few years in some Member States. **The design of UB was modified so as to increase the incentives to work** in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Spain and Italy. Further reforms are anticipated in Greece, France, Poland and Slovakia to strengthen the monitoring of job search activity and sanctions for non-compliance.

Job search incentives in Lithuania. Lithuania redesigned social assistance in order to reduce the poverty trap and encourage reemployment. As part of reform measures enacted in June 2013, the maximum duration of claiming full social benefit was reduced from 36 months to 12 months, while those entering a job after unemployment spell of more than a year, continue to receive 50 % of their previous cash benefits in addition to their wage for a period of six months. Recipients may continue to receive full benefits upon employment, provided that their household incomes do not exceed the amount of state supported income by more than 20%. This latter amendment may encourage the take-up of casual or part-time jobs, which may be low paid but can be a stepping stone towards regular work.

² However, in Portugal, a recent measure allows the unemployed who return to work in less than 6 months to retain full eligibility of previous contribution periods for future unemployment spells.

In addition to UB, other welfare provisions, including early retirement schemes or disability benefits can also play a role as automatic stabilisers during economic crises, even though in past crisis, they had detrimental long-term effects, being expensive and ultimately undermining labour supply. During earlier recessions, early retirement and disability pensions had been widely used to contain the rise of unemployment. However, during the recent recession Member States on the whole resisted the temptation to resort to early retirement and disability benefits. The **shift towards activation policies and away from generous cash transfers for people with disabilities and incentives for early retirement has continued or at least was not reversed in most Member States.**

Swedish measures to activate disabled job seekers have been implemented step by step over the past twenty years. The fiscal crisis of the 1990s created a strong impetus for cutting welfare expenditure. The debates over how this should be done, built up political support and empirical evidence for removing labour supply disincentives and strengthening activation. This helped the Swedish government to maintain the measures implemented in late 2008, which made disability benefit available in case of a permanent reduction in work capacity, and abolished the possibility of time-limited disability benefit.

The Dutch reform of the disability benefit for youth combined supply and demand side incentives in order to prevent long term unemployment and inactivity. The Wajong scheme covers young persons who became handicapped before age 17 (or before 30 and still in education) and is paid until retirement age at 65. It was reformed in 2009, with the aim of getting people into regular employment. New claimants are no longer assessed for lifelong disability: the scheme was split into two phases: 18-27 years and 27+ years with a mandatory activation plan for the first group and a definitive benefits assessment at 27 years. The plan involves training and reintegration obligations for the client as well as counselling and access to ALMP. When Wajong recipients find a job they can keep the benefit with a 50% deduction of their wage earnings. Wage subsidies are also available and there is some support for employer focused job coaching. From 1 January 2015 onwards municipalities will become responsible for partly disabled young individuals. The extent to which such individuals are able to work will be assessed by an independent medical examiner. The same legal and financial regime will hold as discussed for the Work and Social Assistance Act. The strong involvement of health care providers will however be a major difference, as additional rehabilitation measures may be necessary.

Discussions during the Peer Review on [Extending Working Life: The tripartite cooperation and the role of the Centre for Senior Policy](#) in Oslo and the Thematic Review Seminar on Tackling Long Term Unemployment in 2012 have highlighted that **virtually all countries have started to take steps to eliminate disincentives to extending working lives**, although most of the attention so far has been placed on reforming pensions in order to keep older employees in work, for instance by phasing out early retirement schemes, increasing the statutory retirement age or raising contribution years. These so-called "stick measures" have already had a clear impact on the labour market participation of older workers. However, the effective extension of working lives will remain challenging without accompanying measures to improve working conditions and employability around the lifecycle. Indeed, many barriers to work at an older age remain on the ground; for example, the lack of motivation of older workers needs to be taken into account and calls for the implementation of genuine age-friendly policies at company level.

Reorganisation of PES

Tightening budgets exert increasing pressure on the PES to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their measures. PES must prove the added value of their services in a context of rising demand and constrained budgets.

Reforms to PES during the 2011-2013 period have taken place in 18 countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Several Member States reorganised PES (Lithuania, Luxembourg, Ireland), decentralised activation (Denmark, Lithuania,) and increased staff capacity (France, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden).³

Denmark devolved the operation of benefits and employment services for the unemployed and individuals on sickness benefit to the municipal level in 2009 and decentralised the policy making mechanism as well. In the new system "one-stop-shop" assists the unemployed on all issues concerning unemployment benefit and social security. To ensure that state-level objectives are supported by the local governments, the state has a financial compensation mechanism that enables it to control the policy-making taking place at the local-level. The devolution was preceded and to some extent prepared by a comprehensive reform affecting the structure and size of municipalities, whereby the number of municipalities was reduced by almost two-thirds, while their remit and capacity was significantly expanded.

In **France**, during the summer of 2013, the French Public Employment Service (Pôle Emploi) **began to implement its new services offered to the unemployed**, building on the main axes of the new roadmap developed during 2013. Moreover, the PES recruited an additional 2 000 job counsellors during 2013. Alongside these new recruits, on-going internal redeployment meant that there were a total of 6 000 additional job counsellors by the end of 2013, increasing the number of job counsellors currently in post to 35 000.

Partnerships with private employment agencies were also used by some Member States to ensure additional capacity (France, Italy and Poland). Furthermore, other Member States reinforced cooperation between social partners, training centres and PES at regional level (e. g. the mobility centres in the Netherlands). In some countries including the Netherlands and the UK, the carefully implemented expansion of e-services/online services had contributed to free up PES capacities for more intensive assistance for the hard-to-place. Other countries such as Germany focused on the refinement of profiling and targeting mechanisms as a way to improve the cost-effectiveness of ALMP.

The Dutch Public Employment Services implemented a large-scale switch from face-to-face to online-platform service provision. The target is that 90% of the interaction and services will take place online, making the interaction of the job-seeker and the PES more time- and cost-efficient. At the same time, people less likely to take advantage of the online PES services (e.g. older workers or people with a mental disability) continue to be offered the same services face-to-face. The

³ For further information on recent PES developments see European Commission, PES to PES Dialogue - <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=964&langId=en>

reform is expected to yield significant expenditure cuts in the years to come while allowing face to face interactions to focus on the most difficult to place individuals.

The Bundesagentur für Arbeit in Germany developed the so-called KodiaK '4 Phase Model' that functions as a complementary element of the job-search assistance service provided by the PES. The Model helps to facilitate and standardise the assessment of soft and intellectual skills. Its starting point is a profiling mechanism consisting of both face-to-face (navigated by a psychologist) and computer-assisted interview modules assessing soft and intellectual skills. Test results of the profiling help to define realistic labour market goals and appropriate training schedule as well. A continuous feedback-mechanism accompanying the system ensures the persistent commitment of the client in the long-run and thus contributes to the speedy return of the job-seeker to the labour market.

The Universal JobMatch is the UK Government's online job posting and job matching service, which aims to make it easier for jobseekers to find positions that match their skills and needs. In late 2012, the UK government began a new online job posting and job matching service, Universal JobMatch. It is joined up to the social welfare system in that some benefit claimants are now obliged to show that they use the system regularly in order to continue receiving their payments. The creation of the service is positive as it aims to make the job search faster and clearer. In theory, it also makes it possible for advisors working in job centres (Jobcentre Plus) to spend more time building a relationship with jobseekers and less time on the administrative duties associated with finding vacancies.

Beyond the reforms of PES services, reforms also affected internal management systems ranging from upgrading Performance Management Systems to developing evaluation and research capacities.

However, few Member States have conducted systematic evaluations of the recent PES reforms so that the evidence base to support policy learning at the European level remains limited.

Introducing new or redesigned ALMPs

ALMP expenditure differs significantly from country to country and no strong correlation can be found between levels of expenditure and unemployment rates, with some countries with high unemployment rates having reduced expenditure on ALMPs during the crisis.

There has been a general trend in ALMPs to focus on prevention on the one hand, and on the other to prioritise individuals considered most at risk of remaining unemployed. The latter requires a well-designed and implemented profiling approach. This can be a challenge for cash-strapped Public Employment Services (PES) in a number of Member States.

The potential impact and added value of specific types of ALMPs may vary according to the economic cycle. In addition, the success of ALMPs is strongly conditioned by the design and scale of the scheme, target group and focus.

ALMPs supporting job retention (e.g. work sharing schemes, short-time work allowances) are justified especially at the beginning of a crisis. Later on, the use of these measures may block the necessary adjustment in the structure of production during the upturn and thus may delay recovery. Thus, such 'preventive' measures may only be effective in the initial stage of severe recessions.

Targeted incentives for job creation generally perform much better in times of recovery.

Importantly, regardless of the economic context, measures such as (wage) subsidy schemes tend to show high deadweight effect if they are not well targeted and small in scale. Research also indicates that subsidy schemes targeting particular groups (such as older workers) need to go hand in hand with awareness raising, as the ultimate success of integration measures is often contingent on changing employer attitudes. Furthermore, the effectiveness of such measures can be increased through individual coaching, strong follow-up and a target group focus.

The Come Back (*Eingliederungsbeihilfe*) **programme of the Austrian PES** was introduced in the late 1990s and offers a subsidy to firms hiring unemployed persons at risk of becoming long-term unemployed. The duration and amount of the subsidy vary according to the regional labour market situation. The focus has changed several times since it was launched (e.g. in 2000 to include the older unemployed). Since 2012 Austria has put special emphasis on a newly defined group of long term unemployed regarded as particularly threatened in terms of their chances of returning to the labour market (*Arbeitsmarktferne Personen*). The scope of the subsidy has been extended accordingly and it is anticipated to provide support to this particularly vulnerable group of unemployed above all. (Eurofound, 2013). Funding for the programme has been extended to cover up to 40 000 participants until 2016.

Ireland replaced its former wage subsidy schemes with JobsPlus in July 2013. The merger and simplification of two existing subsidies is expected to boost take-up by employers. The earlier system of multiple schemes was potentially confusing, poorly marketed and requiring too much administration. JobsPlus provides a cash-flow benefit to the employer that recruits a long term unemployed person (of over 12 months), with a higher subsidy for those unemployed for over 24 months, and is payable for two years. The scheme provides a fixed grant payment to businesses per new employee. From an employer perspective, the typical value of the incentive over a two year period is circa 23% of the gross national minimum wage cost. Employers can register on www.jobsplus.ie to become an eligible employer and can also instruct a potential employee to apply online at <http://www.jobsplus.ie> and verify their eligibility.

In-work benefits and public works are generally not very cost-efficient in terms of raising employment, but might be cost-efficient in reducing poverty and inequity and therefore have a role to play in difficult economic times.

In a situation of a strong economic downturn where the creation of new employment opportunities in the open market is limited, some countries have used instruments of direct job creation such as public works to provide opportunities for (long-term) unemployed individuals. Although such schemes can have positive effects on work habits and motivation and poverty reduction, evaluations of large scale public works programmes however tended to show high deadweight effects and limited added value. The effectiveness of direct job creation programmes can be enhanced by offering a working environment which is close to that of the regular labour market, includes periods of training and other supporting measures (e.g. to deal with other social or family problems). This again highlights the need for individualised approaches. The ability of the PES to provide individualised pathways, the design of targeted, evidence-based measures, and the involvement of all relevant partners at local level are critical success factors.

Activation and sanctioning measures are expected to provide cost-effective results during periods of growth. During a recession, such measures can also

contribute to shortening the time spent in unemployment, but could also increase financial hardship.

While early activation and identification plays an important role in preventing long term unemployment, it must be carefully targeted in order to reduce deadweight effects. This requires a detailed analysis of programme effects, which are currently lacking in most Member States.

A notable exception is a recent **Danish project based on controlled experiments** compared the effectiveness of different combinations of ALMP measures for various subgroups and evaluated the effects in a series of studies. For newly unemployed jobseekers frequent one-on-one meetings with case-workers seem the most effective: reemployment rates increased by 10%, implying that this measure is also cost-efficient. Group meetings have a smaller but still positive impact. Early activation (including early referral to a training or subsidy) is effective for men, especially young men, and especially during more favourable macroeconomic conditions. For women the impact is negative, due to locking-in effects. Importantly, the combination of group meetings with early programme participation has no effect (implying a net loss). For long term unemployed or disabled jobseekers the same interventions lead to markedly different outcomes. In their case, frequent meetings tend to increase activation (programme participation) only, with no increase in reemployment.

ALMPs providing incentives for human capital enhancement show mixed results according to evaluations. This is mainly due to locking-in effects, which, for some groups at least, tend to increase with the duration of the programme. In deep recessions however, when the decline in labour demand affects all skill levels, training measures might only be useful in tandem with work sharing schemes. On-the-job training is generally found to be more effective than classroom based training. Programmes that combine classroom with on-the-job training have been found to be especially effective for example in Italy, compared with solely classroom based training. While being a very costly measure, on-the-job training targeted at long-term unemployed workers seems to be a cost-effective recovery measure.

Conclusions

European PES have made considerable effort to meet the challenges posed by the global financial crisis. Effective ALMPs and UB systems which make work pay while at the same time securing decent minimum income are also clearly at the heart of the policy debate not only at EU level but also in the Member States.

However despite the number of reforms affecting UB, PES and ALMPs introduced, the evaluation evidence available is still too little or it is too early to see the effects of the reform process.

From the limited (and sometimes contradictory) information currently available, the following conclusions emerged as part of the MLP discussions:

- The prospects for the large scale expansion of labour demand through wage subsidies are poor. Large scale schemes tend to show limited success combined with strong deadweight effects;
- Smaller scale subsidy and indeed public works programmes might be cost-efficient, particularly in reducing poverty and inequity, if they are well targeted and combine work experience close to the reality of the labour market, individual support and training with strong monitoring and follow-up;

- Work experience and training measures can also contribute to improving skills match and maintaining employability, even if there are no immediate employment outcomes;
- Prevention and early intervention are important and should be combined with an individualised approach. Both require strong support by PES (or private sector actors) with reasonable case loads, which some PES currently find difficult to achieve as budgets contract and demand increases.
- Unemployment benefit systems not only provide vital income support, but can also act as an important link between the individual and labour market intermediation by the PES;
- When considering unemployment benefit reforms, the wider benefit framework (social benefits, disability and early retirement pensions) needs to be taken into account as in combination they provide the necessary safety net;
- Unemployment benefit reforms which place greater requirements on job seekers during a recession can be counterproductive. Linking unemployment benefit systems with economic trends has been recommended to extend entitlements during times of crisis;
- Benefit systems need to be transparent to allow clarity in demonstrating to job seekers that they will be better off in work. In-work benefit and specific attention to low wage sectors can play an important role here; and
- The potential of administrative data should be further exploited for evaluation purposes, taking into account that the most effective way of evaluating labour market policy is to use a combination of research methods, relying on both administrative data and surveys (including longitudinal follow-up surveys). Ideally, the type of administrative data to be collected for monitoring and evaluation purposes should be discussed prior to the launching of a new policy measure. Continuous efforts to develop an 'evaluation culture' are important in order to stimulate and/or maintain commitment across Member State governments to collect relevant and accurate administrative data for evaluation purposes. With regard to the effectiveness of ALMPs, one of the key messages remains that current evaluation efforts are insufficient to provide a clear picture on effective measures for different target groups.

Further opportunities for mutual learning

Unemployment benefits, PES reform and ALMP effectiveness are important topics across many if not all Member States. The challenges faced reinforce the need for mutual learning activities on what works, where and why.

The Mutual Learning Programme is an initiative led by DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) aimed at promoting the exchange of information and good practice between Member States, as well as the wider dissemination of the European Employment Strategy (EES).

Peer Reviews are one of the main tools of the Mutual Learning Programme (MLP), central to working towards the goals of the European Employment Strategy. The Peer Review approach is based on a dynamic dialogue between a 'host country' who presents and wishes to gain feedback on an effective policy, programme or measure and 'peer countries'. The Peer Review takes place in the host country, with government representatives and independent experts from up to 10 peer countries. The Peer Review takes place over one and a half days, involving presentations on the host country policy example, a brief round table of the peer countries' experiences, followed by a number of working group discussions to facilitate mutual exchange and learning. Overall, the

event is highly focused and interactive, which can lead to networking and follow-up after the Peer Review has taken place, including the organisation of Learning Exchanges. The MLP has a long, successful history of organising Peer Reviews. Further information on these Peer Reviews can be found on the [MLP website](#).

Learning Exchanges are a new feature of the Mutual Learning Programme (MLP) aimed at enhancing and embedding the learning between Member States in the context of working towards the goals of the European Employment Strategy. The Learning Exchange approach is based on a facilitated dialogue of a small number of Member States who have a common interest in examining and sharing experiences in relation to a particular area of employment policy. It often builds on discussions that have taken place in an MLP Peer Review on a related topic.

Several Learning Exchanges have already been organised and the feedback from the participating Member States has been very positive. The results of these Learning Exchanges are available on the [MLP website](#).

For Member States interested in organising a Peer Review or Learning Exchange and would like further information and support, please contact Emilio Castrillejo (Emilio.CASTRILLEJO@ec.europa.eu) or Ruth Santos in the MLP support team (ruth.santos@ghkint.com).

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The MLP main activities that have informed this paper are as follows:

Peer Reviews

Activation measures in times of crisis: the role of public works; Riga, Latvia, 26-27 April
2012

*Extending working lives: Tripartite cooperation and the role of the Centre for Senior
Policy*; Oslo, Norway, 24-25 May 2012

Evaluation of labour market policies and programmes: the use of data driven analysis;
Brussels, Belgium, 19-20 November 2012

Thematic Seminars

*Tackling long-term employment: effective strategies to address long-term
unemployment*; Brussels, Belgium, 8 November 2012


Unemployment benefits in times of crisis: their role as automatic stabilisers, Brussels,
Belgium, 7 November 2011

Learning Exchanges

Study visit on public works and 'works of social value' programmes; Athens, Greece,
18-19 October 2012

Annex 1: Graph

Graph I.4.1: Average number of labour market measures by policy domain across EU-27 countries



(1) The LABREF database has information on reforms in Malta only from 2002, while reforms in Romania and Bulgaria are included from 2003. The average number of reforms for the period 2000—2007 was calculated by taking this into account.

Source: DG ECFIN LABREF database.

Source: EC 2013