

RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN HUNGARY

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Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Definitions and theoretical background of right-wing extremism.....	1
Actors.....	4
Activities	8
Constituency.....	13
Competing explanations for the rise of Jobbik.....	14
Conclusion.....	17
Bibliography.....	19
Annotated bibliography on Hungarian right-wing extremism in English	22
Annotated bibliography on Hungarian right-wing extremism <i>in comparative perspective</i> in English	24

Introduction¹

In the past few years right wing extremism (hereinafter RWE) has been on the rise in several EU countries. One of those has been Hungary, where the political party Jobbik became the strongest force in parliamentary opposition in 2014. This paper highlights some of the most common manifestations of RWE and is meant to help to understand Hungarian RWE in the Central-East-European (CEE) context. The review focuses on Jobbik and other actors of the RWE scene in Hungary between 2003 and 2014. It does not address earlier RWE parties (such as MIÉP) in Hungary, or ethnic Hungarian movements outside Hungary (e.g. in Transylvania or among immigrant communities in the US).

Section one offers a theoretical background to RWE and explains the nature of extremism of Jobbik with particular attention to the EU and CEE context. Section two describes the origin, electoral results and communication strategy of Jobbik, and proceeds in presenting other key media and civil actors of the RWE scene in Hungary. Section three highlights the influence of RWE activities in four aspects of public life, namely public discourse on Roma, the governmental political agenda, local administration and paramilitary activism. Section four describes Jobbik constituency in terms of available demographic and socio-economic data. Section five offers attempt to explain the breakthrough of Jobbik in the 2009–2010 Hungarian national elections by focusing on such factors as popular attitudes, ongoing political crises and the role of the internet. The conclusion summarises the findings.²

Definitions and theoretical background of right-wing extremism

Defining RWE parties is a challenging task. On one hand, the self-reference of extremist parties is characterised by the Orwellian “double-speak” as they often define themselves by conventional political ideas such as “national,” “democratic” or “progressive,”³ but they do not necessarily interpret these ideas similarly to mainstream parties. On the other hand, there is a considerable disagreement among political scientists as to how to refer to RWE parties and whether they can be grouped under the same party family. Pippa Norris notes that standard reference works use diverse labels categorising parties as “far” or “extreme” right, “new right,” “anti-immigrant,” “authoritarian,” “anti-government,” “ultra-nationalist” and so on (Norris, 2005, p. 44). Because of the diversity of labels and ideological orientation, it is probably more useful to think of RWE as of a number of sub-groups or clusters of RWE party families, rather than as of a single party family.

Cas Mudde has attempted to classify RWE parties according to their political ideologies (Mudde, 1995). He identified five ideological features that were most often used to describe RWE parties (nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and a preference for a strong state) and found that the 26 scholars who used these features came up with just as many combinations as is their number. Also, scholars have typically offered a different combination of features, depending on the scientific methodology used: whether it was qualitative, quantitative, or a combination of the two. Mudde concluded that there was no objective ground to define what combination of ideological

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² The author wishes to thank Balázs Váradi, Lóránt Győri, Attila Juhász and Julianna Orsós for their help, input and feedback on earlier versions of this paper, written under the aegis of the Budapest Institute for Policy Research of Budapest, Hungary.

³ RWE parties which define themselves in these terms include, e.g. the People’s Party Our Slovakia, the National Democratic Party in Germany, or the Progress Party in Norway.

features constituted RWE and, instead of further refining this conceptual criteria, he emphasised it more important for scholars to acquire a more in-depth insight into the ideologies of the alleged RWE parties (Mudde, 1995, p. 219).

The main RWE party in Hungary, Jobbik – the Movement for Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom) has been casually described (also by the author of this paper) rather simplistically as “extremist” or “radical,” but both of these labels are, to an extent, vague. “Extremist” carries a popular and negative connotation, which actually only means that the party is *beyond* the right wing political parties, but says nothing about the content of its ideology. Similarly, Jobbik’s preferred label for itself “national-radical” only communicates, though more positively than the “extremism”, that the party is more radical in its nationalism, more conservative than the mainstream conservative Fidesz, but it leaves one wondering what it is that the party actually wishes to preserve. A way out from this theoretical conundrum is offered by Dániel Róna, who suggests to understand that Jobbik as an anti-establishment party. This typology more clearly identifies the party relationship to the democratic system and other political actors within (Róna, 2014, pp. 25–44).

Image 1. Members of the Hungarian Guard take their oath of allegiance on Hero Square, Budapest



Source: <http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/>

Róna identifies three main dimensions, according to which Jobbik can be considered anti-establishment party. The first consists of the means the party uses to achieve its goals. An obvious case is the creation of the Hungarian Guard, self-defence movement, which engages in paramilitary training and, by its existence, questions the party attitude to the principle of states monopoly on violence. Although the Guard is unarmed, as the Constitution forbids political parties to establish their own armed units, Gábor Vona, the chairman of Jobbik, argues that intention of his party is to eventually incorporate the Guard into the national police forces.

The second dimension is the party approach to fundamental democratic principles, including the rights and dignity of members of minority communities such as the Roma and Jews. While phrases

such as “Gypsy terror”, “Gypsy breeding” and “procreation for social benefits” (i.e. child-breeding for the sake to entitlement to social benefits; megélhetési népszaporulat) are part of Jobbik vocabulary when talking about the Roma on local for, other expressions, such as “Gypsy-crime” have proved so successful that they have been adopted and have become widely established in mainstream public discourse (see sec. 4 on *Activities*). Regarding Jews, Jobbik members have repeatedly expressed statements which marginalised the Holocaust either in terms of the number of victims, or in terms of Hungary’s responsibility for collaborating with the Nazi Germany in organising exterminations. In 2012, a Jobbik MP, Márton Gyöngyösi, labelled Hungarian Jews in the Parliament to be “national security risks” and called for the registering of Jews with dual citizenship. Despite the international controversy that surrounded the statement, Jobbik did not officially distance itself from the statement and Gyöngyösi faced no sanctions in the party either.

Thirdly, Jobbik has unconventional understanding of political rights. It intends to restrict voting rights of adults who have not completed elementary education in order to limit political influence of the illiterate and poorest strata: it is known that the Roma are overrepresented among them (*Miért nem vagyunk*, 2012). Such interpretation of political rights goes against the conventional principles of democracy and universal suffrage.

It ought to be noted that there are also certain dimensions according to which Jobbik does conform to democratic principles. For example, Jobbik accepts the minimalist conception of democracy⁴ (Schumpeter, 1942) and, at least since its presence in European Parliament and the Hungarian Parliament, it does not question the fairness and legitimacy of electoral results. The party also respects and plays to the “rules of the game” (Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 3–38): when the first formation of the Hungarian Guard was banned by the court, the Party dissolved the movement and paid all fines levied upon the party members associated with the movement. These features deserve a mention as they enable us to distinguish Jobbik from more radical political entities, such as the neo-Nazi parties and their terror cells in Germany, which openly subscribe to Nazi ideology (white supremacy, eugenics) and engage in criminal activities.

On the other side of the spectrum, Jobbik also differs from conventional conservative parties precisely because of its idiosyncratic understanding of democracy, verbal aggression towards minorities, and the maintenance of a paramilitary organisation. It is these features that best define the content of Jobbik’s anti-establishment position on the conservative – extreme – neo-Nazi spectrum. This paper will use this understanding when applying the term RWE to Jobbik.

Placing the Hungarian case in an international context, a few commonalities between Jobbik and the current RWE parties elsewhere in Europe can be identified (Ökopolisz, n.d., pp. 7–8; Róna, 2014 sec.2). Ethnocentrism is the most important and general feature of RWE parties. It incorporates aspects of both traditional nationalism and anti-minority position, although nowadays ethnocentric parties are not as antagonised by rivalry between different nation-states, but rather by the presence of cultural minorities in their own country. While the “other” cultural group is usually represented by Muslim minorities in the West, it is often the Roma in the East. Yet the type of exclusionary tactics used against them are quite similar in both cases. The repertoire includes calling for tougher “law and order” policies to protect the majority population from the high crime rates allegedly observed among minority groups, anti-elitism against mainstream parties that exercise a too permissive,

⁴ The minimalist conception views democracy as merely an electoral process in which citizens vote for the purpose of selecting competing elites (Schumpeter 1942, Ch. XXI). This conception defies more substantive ones, which assert that democracy is a system that promotes either a particular notion of public good (Rousseauian tradition) or embodies a certain combination of liberal and egalitarian values (Rawlsian tradition).

liberal policy towards minorities, and Euroscepticism to prioritise the nation's right to self-determination vis-à-vis external interference.

Beyond these general features, there are a number of distinctions between RWE parties that one can observe particularly across the traditional East-West divide (Gimes, Juhász, Kiss, & Krekó, 2009 sec. 8; Róna, 2014 sec. 2). Due to the legacy of Communism, most CEE countries still experience high popular demand for paternalism and a strong state that takes care of citizens. The parties in the region have accommodated themselves to these electoral needs and rarely advocate the virtues of market economy and self-reliance similarly to, for instance, the libertarian RWEs do in Scandinavia. They also tend to be morally more conservative towards such issues as drugs, abortion, homosexuality. In this context it would be probably much more difficult to conceive that an openly homosexual politician would have a real chance to become a party leader, as it was the case of Pim Fortuyn List in the Netherlands. The anti-establishment attitude is also differently interpreted: while in the West it is usually directed against the political elite, in the East it defies the whole democratic framework. A good example here is the proliferation of self-defence/paramilitary movements in the east, which are almost unprecedented in the West. Their aim is not merely to reform or strengthen the police corps, but to replace them. Finally, it is worth noting that differences exist even within the CEE such as in attitudes towards the previous Communist regime. Since counter-culture in Hungary was traditionally a right-wing phenomenon and a number of RWE party members (or their ancestors) were systematically persecuted during the previous regime, the RWE parties are fiercely anti-Communist in Hungary.

Actors

RWE in Hungary consists of much more than Jobbik. Since the early years of this millennium a number of RWE organisations and movements have sprung up and strengthened with Jobbik, creating together a large network of traditional and online media, heritage organisations, paramilitary groups, festivals, national rock bands, a collage, and online shops. This infrastructure caters to the identity of members of the subculture and provides them with anything from clothes to leisure activities and a sense of community. The following section provides a brief overview about Jobbik and (its relationship to) some of the main organisations on the RWE landscape.

Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom)

The party of Jobbik was founded in 2003. It grew out of a student movement called Right-Wing Youth Association (Jobboldali Ifjúsági Közösség), which was founded by university students in humanities in Budapest in 1999. The party defines itself as conservative, Christian and national-radical.⁵ Its Founding Document (Jobbik, 2003) states that one of the aims is to accomplish regime change in Hungary, as the party believes that, in spite of the fall of Communism in 1989, political change had only happened partially: the same crony networks continued to rule the country as did the ones under Communism, and all political parties served foreign rather than national interests (Jobbik, 2003). Jobbik rejects the allegation that it is an extremist party. Its representatives consider other neoliberal parties in the Parliament to be "extremists," that, in their interpretation, pursue "anti-national politics contradictory to Hungarian interests, culture and values" (*Exkluzív*, n.d.).

⁵ See Jobbik's website at: <http://jobbik.hu/>

Table 1. Election results of Jobbik

	Number of regional list votes	% of votes	Number of mandates	% of mandates
2006 national ⁶	119 007	2.20 %	--	--
2009 EP	427 773	14.77 %	3	13.64 %
2010 national	855 436	16.67 %	47	12.18 %
2014 EP	340 287	14.67 %	3	14.29 %
2014 national	1 017 550	20.69 %	23	11.56 %

Source: National Election Office: <http://valasztas.hu/> Note: The discrepancy between the proportion of votes and mandates in national elections can be attributed to a series of amendments in the electoral law passed by the 2nd Fidesz government (2010–2014), which reduced by half the number of available seats in the Parliament and introduced a stronger majoritarian model for turning votes into mandates.

The party first competed unsuccessfully in the national elections in 2006, in an electoral coalition together with, then already weakening, right-wing extremist force, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet pártja -- MIÉP) which had had its heyday in the 1990s. The breakthrough of Jobbik occurred in 2009, when it ran alone in the elections for the European Parliament and won 14.8% of votes, what allowed it to send three representatives to the EP. The staggering results of Jobbik were unexpected and had been underestimated by public opinion polls prior to the elections, which might be attributable to the initially associated stigma with Jobbik (Rudas, 2010). In national elections in 2010, the party gained 16.7% of the regional votes. That firmly established Jobbik as a major force on the Hungarian political scene. In the most recent national elections, in 2014, the party managed to further increase its support base and gained 20.7% of votes.

Since 2003, Jobbik has developed communication strategy with three main strengths:⁷

- The first is anti-establishment politics. The party has never been in power at the national level and its members can credibly present themselves to the electorate as “clean” of the dirty business of politics. It is also telling that Jobbik prefers to refer to itself as a movement rather than a party – a label perceived as having certain negative connotations – and its representatives are very active at the local level by organising public fora and maintaining direct contact with the population. All of these features help to reinforce the idea that Jobbik is different from mainstream political parties.
- The second strength is its thematic focus on Roma, addressing a serious and complex social problem. To achieve improvement in that area by effective inclusion policies would require significant budget resources and political courage in countering the widespread anti-Roma racism. Therefore, mainstream Hungarian parties prefer not to talk too much about the issue. In contrast, the representatives of Jobbik pride themselves in electoral campaign posters such as the “We say it out loud and solve it” slogan which clearly refers to taboo issues, including the conflicts between non-Roma and Roma (*Jobbik választási program*, 2014).
- The third strength is anti-Semitism, which serves as an all-explaining worldview for the core Jobbik adherents. The conspiracy theories pertaining to Jews have perhaps been most succinctly articulated by the Protestant Evangelical pastor, Hegedűs Loránt Jr, who said that “‘Gypsy-crime’ was a biological weapon in the hands of Zionists” (*A cigányság biológiai*

⁶ Jobbik in electoral alliance with MIÉP.

⁷ The author is grateful to Attila Juhász, senior analyst at Political Capital, for giving these insights in an earlier interview in the framework of the Citizens Beyond Borders project on 22 May 2014.

fegyver, 2014). This is a tenet that certainly not all Jobbik voters believe. Therefore, the party officials are careful to voice these views only on certain closed platforms, such as rural local fora. Nevertheless, the anti-Semitic worldview serves as an all-explaining ideology and rounds up well the core beliefs promoted by Jobbik. It is these three positions together – the anti-establishment politics, anti-Roma and anti-Semitic that most clearly differentiate Jobbik from other parties in Hungary.

Media

Jobbik has a few weekly (*Barikád*) and bi-monthly (*Hazai pálya*) print periodicals. Yet its real presence is online. It operates a web-based radio channel (Szent-Korona Rádió) and a video channel (N1TV), and has been remarkably active on various news portals (alfahir.hu), blogs (*Bombagyár*) and social network sites.⁸ The online space represents a massive capital for Jobbik, as it enables the party to keep their voters constantly updated at a very low cost, something that would have been impossible for the party through mainstream media. The online sites not only provide instant updates on party activities, but are also a depository for a host of conspiracy theories on various historical events and literary themes, such as Hungarian pre-history [őstörténet], the Treaty of Trianon, the Second World War, ideologies of nationalism, and the terror of Communism.

While the news portal alfahir.hu serves as the mouthpiece of Jobbik, it is not the main online platform of RWE. The Kuruc.info website, maintained by a Hungarian-American on US servers and featuring radical Hungarian news content has a much larger audience. In 2014, it was estimated to have 60,000 individual page visitors per day (Szabó & Bene, 2015, p. 127).⁹ Kuruc.info features less PC content which the party or its associates are unwilling to publish under their own name. Indeed, all entries are published under pseudonyms. Its style is highly slanted and it categorises, inter alia, news content under such headings as “Gypsy- crime,” “Jewish-crime,” “politician-crime” and “anti-Hungarianism”. The site has been controversial because it incites violence and repeatedly violated personal data protection laws. It took part in the coordination of the 2006 riots in Budapest, and published the names, addresses, phone numbers of police officers and judges involved in the subsequent legal cases, calling upon readers to harass them (Athena Institute, n.d.). Because of hate speech and privacy violations, Hungarian governments have tried to shut down the website, but their attempts were rejected by the US Government based on the First Amendment of the US Constitution, addressing freedom of speech.

A major reason behind Jobbik’s strong online presence is that the party was ignored by mainstream media from its inception until at least 2010, and to some extent until 2010–2014. It had no choice but to learn to use alternative media. The party has initiated a number of legal cases against media channels, arguing that it has received biased or disproportionately limited coverage in comparison to other parties. In some of the cases, Jobbik’s complaint was supported by the National Media Authority, and respective media channels were fined or requested to apologise (*A Jobbik pártján*, 2013). While media did engage with some of the topics that were raised by RWE, it usually did so in the absence of RWE representatives until 2014 (Szabó & Bene, 2015). This trend seems to have been changed as of national elections in 2014, when Jobbik representatives have started to appear in talk shows in the media, left and right alike, where previously they were considered *personae non gratae*. It seems that the mainstream media has changed a strategy and realised that they can no longer continue to ignore a party that has 20% in public support.

⁸ Jobbik prides itself in being the only Hungarian party which has more supporters online (287, 000 followers on Facebook) than registered party members (13, 000 in 2011).

⁹ This was also confirmed by alexa.com web traffic data which, at the time of writing of this report, ranked kuruc.info as the 97th most popular Hungarian website in contrast to barikad.hu, which was ranked 171th (Accessed 2015-05-25).

Paramilitary and other organisations

There is relatively little objective information available about paramilitary organisations in academic literature. The three main organisations close to Jobbik include the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement ("Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom" – HVIM), The Hungarian Guard [Magyar Gárda] and its various splinter organisations, and the Outlaws' Army [Betyársereg]. Among these, the oldest is the HVIM established in 2001 by a RWE cult figure, László Toroczkai, the current mayor of the village of Ásotthalom (Csongrád County, Southern Hungary). The name of the organisation, HVIM, refers to the number of administrative districts of the Kingdom of Hungary prior to the Treaty of Trianon (1920). It is the most active paramilitary movement in neighbouring countries inhabited by Hungarian ethnic minorities. The movement has about 60 members and is the main convenor of the Hungarian Sziget, a nationalist alternative to the Budapest Sziget Festival (Athena Institute, n.d.).

Image 2. The Outlaws' Army on a street protest



Source: www.merites.hu

Another and perhaps most infamous organisation, the Hungarian Guard, was established by Gábor Vona, the chairman of Jobbik, in 2007. The aim is "physical, spiritual and intellectual self-defence of Hungarians." The Budapest District Court disbanded the Guard in 2009, after an incident in Tatárszentgyörgy, where the organisation members paraded in a Roma settlement. A part of the Court argument was that the Guard did not confirm to the objectives stipulated in its founding declaration. The verdict also noted that the movement "abused the right to free association, questioned the state monopoly over the legitimate use of force, and threatened the rights of Roma" (Feloszlatták, 2008). A few weeks after the dissolution, the Guard was re-established with slightly modified objectives and the same leadership under the title of New Hungarian Guard. It ought to be noted that, apart from organising street demonstrations against Roma, Jews and homosexuals, the Guard has been involved in various social activities, such as charity or humanitarian disaster management, where the state has either failed or been present only marginally. This type of activism has greatly contributed to the positive popular image of the movement.

The third organisation, the Outlaws' Army, emerged in 2008 from one of the many splinter groups of the banned Hungarian Guard. It is illegal and represents the more radical fraction of self-defence groups. It has about 60 members, who bear arms and engage in activities meant to intimidate the Roma. The Hungarian paramilitary organisations, including the HVIM, the New Hungarian Guard (and presumably the Outlaws' Army, too) signed a cooperation agreement with Jobbik in June 2009 (*Tudta?*, 2011). Their common denominator among is that they are all ultranationalist and intolerant towards minorities, be they Roma, Jews or homosexuals.

Finally, there is a third important group of miscellaneous actors on the RWE scene that does not quite fit into any categories. This includes a wide network of civil actors from entertainment ("national rock bands") to business agents ("National Taxi" or "National Dating Site") and knowledge generation ("King Attila College"). This network, in the literature commonly referred to as "identity infrastructure" (Feischmidt, 2014), is an integral part of the RWE in Hungary. Together with Jobbik and RWE media they help popularising nationalist culture in all walks of life.

Activities

The following part shall address some of the main activities of RWE by focusing on four themes: influence on public discourse, setting the national government agenda, a new model for local level politics, and instigating conflicts by paramilitary activism. The number of the themes and individual illustrative cases are selective and by far not comprehensive. They serve to demonstrate some of those aspects of Hungarian public life where RWE has had the most visible impact in the past few years.

Setting the political agenda

Jobbik has been in opposition since 2010 and had little influence on legislative process in the parliament. The Fidesz government had a 2/3 supermajority in the House which enabled it to pass laws without the need to negotiate or request the support of other parties¹⁰. Having said that, when looking at the Jobbik manifesto, there is a striking similarity in what the party has proposed and what laws the Fidesz government has passed.

In its 2010 electoral programme, Jobbik proposed the first ten measures to adopt once in power. Since then, Fidesz has fulfilled eight out of ten (Balogh, n.d.; Bíró Nagy, Boros, & Varga, 2012, pp. 8–9). Jobbik promised to cut taxes, rescue foreign-currency debtors, reduce public utility fees, tax multinational companies, cut the pensions of former Communist prominent figures, tie social assistance to public work, prevent foreign ownership of land, and award Hungarian citizenship to Hungarians living in neighbouring countries. The only demands which have not been met, were the abolition of parliamentary immunity (point 1) and the establishment of gendarmerie (point 9).

Apart from the ten measures, other well-known demands of Jobbik have also been satisfied by the Fidesz government. In more detailed electoral programmes in 2010 and 2014, as well as in various public statements Jobbik representatives have demanded to base the Constitution on Christian values, protect traditional forms of marriage, reintroduce grading and failure in elementary schools, rename public spaces associated with "negative historical figures" or "events,"¹¹ nationalise private pension funds, make the anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon a national memorial day, adopt a tougher attitude towards Brussels, counterbalance the Euro-Atlantic orientation of the country with

¹⁰ Fidesz government lost its supermajority in the Parliament in February 2015, after a defeat of its candidate in a by-election in the town of Veszprém

¹¹ A few public spaces in Budapest that Fidesz renamed in Spring 2011 include Moscow Square to Széll Kálmán square, Republic Square to John Paul II Square, Roosevelt Square to István Szécheny Square.

stronger ties with Eastern countries,¹² – the list can go on.¹³ As mentioned above, the result is that, by 2015, a staggering number of Jobbik demands or proposals have been realised by the 2nd and 3rd Fidesz government.

Adopting items from Jobbik's programme might be Fidesz's strategy to lure some of the less radical voters of Jobbik. As a consequence of Jobbik's agenda setting function, the politics of Hungary has increasingly radicalised, making the conservative Fidesz to shift further right.¹⁴

Influence on public discourse: the spread of the expression "gypsy-crime"

Public discourse is another area where RWE actors have left their imprint. By pushing the Roma topic, Jobbik has not only managed to set the public agenda, but also re-define how Roma are talked about. Juhász shows how the expression "Gypsy-crime" was an unknown connotation before 2005, and became mainstream as a result of RWE activism coupled with the inability of other parties to adequately respond to it.¹⁵

Juhász traces the origin of the term "Gypsy-crime" to a legal-criminal-police discourse, a rather narrow professional circle in the 1970s and 1980s, but notes that, after the fall of Communism, the term was not used for a long time in the public discourse, let alone the political debate. The term was first reintroduced to public consciousness when Tamás Polgár, a Hungarian blogger who became renown under the nickname Tom Cat, went on a TV debate show to publically defend a computer game entitled Olah Action, simulating the extermination of Roma. At the show and in the following months, Polgár argued that certain groups of Roma were "determined to be criminal" and sought to underpin his claim with incarceration statistics. The incident spurred a heated public debate and the term "Gypsy-crime" first time got out of the narrow criminological vocabulary as RWE blogs and forums started to spread it.

Jobbik first picked up the term after the lynching of Olaszliszka, when a Hungarian driver, thought to have hit a child, was killed by a Roma mob. In response to the incident, the party set up a website called ciganybunozes.com (meaning *Gypsy-crime*) and started to intentionally use the term in campaigns and party manifesto whenever a negative event associated with Roma and non-Roma cohabitation occurred. Graph 1 maps frequency of the use of the term "gypsy-crime" at the time of major news events arising in connection with the Roma in Hungary.


¹² The countries Jobbik sees as favourable foreign policy partners are China, India, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkey. After 2010, Viktor Orbán PM visited all these countries and with Péter Szijjártó, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade started the so-called Eastern Opening government strategy.

¹³ An extensive list of Jobbik's demands and Fidesz's responses up to 2012 was collected by Andras Bíró Nagy and his colleagues in *Right-wing extremism in Hungary* (2012). Since then the list has been continued by journalists in the media. The most recent update has been collected by tebege (2015).

¹⁴ At the same time, one can currently observe a strategy whereby Jobbik attempts to become more mainstream and to address less radical voters. A good example for is Jobbik "pet campaign" prior to the 2014 national elections, where it tried to communicate a much softer image of itself than four years ago. See e.g. the 2014 Jobbik electoral campaign film [The Future cannot be stopped](#).

¹⁵ What follows, is a summary of juhasz_attila (2010).

Graph 1. Frequency of the expression “gypsy-crime” used by media, 2005–2009



Source: <http://www.riskandforecast.com/>

At this time, Juhász claims, there was an important change in the meaning of Roma stereotypes. In addition to the previous popular images referring to stupidity, chicken theft, unemployment and other relatively less ominous stereotypes, a new one emerged that represented Roma as dangerous, aggressive and murderous. It is telling in this respect that the now defunct Hungarian Guard also justified its existence and demonstrations with the need to protect the majority population from the Roma. “So as Jobbik by its campaigns has amplified the threats and ethnic conflicts in relation to Roma, with the establishment of Hungarian Guard, it has seemingly also offered a solution to these serious problems” (juhasz_attila, 2010). Depending on the forum they were presented on, there developed a variety of shades, more and less radical formulations of the Roma problem in Jobbik rhetoric. It was particularly important that the party voiced out loud, for the first time in recent Hungarian politics, what had hitherto been a taboo: they claimed that there was such a thing as “Gypsy-crime.” It was such a powerfully framed concept that other political and media actors, and opinion makers could not defy it and largely accepted it. Had they objected to it, it was not usually because of the meaning of the term, but rather due to the desirability of its use, which spurred a debate further perpetuating the use of the term (Vidra & Fox, 2012, p. 19). The spread of the term “Gypsy-crime” and the subsequent acceptance of its implicit attributes served as a symbol of credibility for Jobbik, and greatly strengthened its image as a party that dares to voice topics that are neglected by other political parties.

Paramilitary activism – Power demonstration in Gyöngyöspata

Gyöngyöspata is a small town in Heves County in North-Eastern Hungary. In the 2011 National Census it had 2,586 inhabitants out of which 318 (12.3%) identified themselves as members of the Roma community. The town became nationally known as a result of the escalating ethnic conflict in Spring 2011 between the local Roma and RWE paramilitary groups. Feischmidt and Szombati (2013) describe the unfolding of events as follows:

The Civil Guard for Better Future (at that time, a wing of the New Hungarian Guard) started patrolling the streets of Gyöngyöspata after an old man from the village blamed Roma for bullying him and committed suicide in 22 February 2011. Two days later, Jobbik's television channel, Barikád TV, broadcasted a report about the village with the title "Gypsy-terror – Heves County on the brink of civil war." Jobbik organised a public demonstration in the main square of the village to which they recruited people with leaflets calling on the public to join a "demonstration against Gypsy-terror". The demonstration was attended by some 1500-2000 locals and activists bussed in. After the speech, Jobbik leaders, accompanied by activists dressed in military uniforms visited the Roma area in the village and handed over a Regulation for orderly cohabitation (Együttélési szabályzat) to the representatives of the Local Roma Self-Government.

After the demonstration the Civil Guard kept patrolling the village for ten more days, and new paramilitary organisations, such as the Outlaw Army, arrived as well. The tension between the Roma population and RWE activists rose from day to day. Police was also present in increased numbers, but, apart from performing identity checks on the foreigners, it was claimed they were not entitled to intervene, because the Civil Guard members did not wear the symbols of banned Hungarian Guard. Amidst the rising tensions the mayor resigned and new elections were called. There were seven candidates: a few local public leaders, a newcomer supported by Jobbik, and a few newcomers backed by the paramilitary organisations. In the end, the candidate supported by Jobbik, Oszkár Juhász, won (by 33.8%). Amidst the high ethnic tensions, he was able to present himself as representing "radical, but common sense and just politics." After his inauguration, Juhász introduced the "Érpatak model," (see below) and some 60–70 Roma emigrated from the town to Canada possibly as a result of the developments.

Margit Feischmidt and Kristóf Szombati (2013) provide a detailed account of the spiralling conflict in Gyöngyöspata. They claim that both sides had long-term grievances, which had paved the way for the conflict. While many Roma had been frustrated by the local elite, which backed segregation policies in housing and education, the majority population was annoyed by some of the petty theft and provocations by certain members of the Roma community. Both communities faced a difficult economic situation given that the town is located in a disadvantaged region. Until 2010, however, the approach of municipality towards Roma was characterised by "consensual silence." This changed after the appearance of RWE organisations on the spot and the spread of "Gypsy-crime" narrative in public discourse. The mayor was put under pressure, and a candidate without any previous experience in politics, but enjoying the backing of Jobbik, could easily take over the municipality. The case of Gyöngyöspata is a prime local level example of how Jobbik can use paramilitary organisations to aggravate ethnic conflicts and make political capital out of the event.

The Érpatak Model

Érpatak is a village in North-East Hungary (the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county), which became known for its administrative model relying on strict law enforcement and intimidation of local population. The model has been developed by Mihály Zoltán Orosz, mayor of Érpatak, who became an inspiration for many municipalities since 2005.

Orosz has a simplified concept of human nature (*Robbanáshoz vezethet*, 2011). He differentiates between constructive [építő] and subversive [romboló] members of society, and maintains that "the most subversive" members need to be punished harshly, so that the "weaker ones" know the standards they needed to abide by. He perceives the task of municipality to fight "subversives" continuously, as long as they do not "change, leave, or are not put into prison." Examples of tough measures in Érpatak include such regulations that gardens of local residents were not allowed to

have weed, or must be in the fridge of households with children. Punishment for smaller offences may result in withdrawal of social benefits or even incarceration.

Image 3. Mihály Zoltán Orosz as featured on the cover of *The Érpatak Model* documentary.¹⁶



Source: www.urania-nf.hu

While the mayor makes no secret of his view that it is Roma individuals who caused the most problems in the village, he insists that his approach does not differentiate between Roma and non-Roma, only between cooperative and subversive members of society. It has been widely reported in the media that crime rates in the village have dropped dramatically since the establishment of the model. Locals (mostly Roma) are active in public work programmes where they cultivate the countryside, work on the maintenance of the cemetery and the canals. The village is planning to establish a new NGO for local community work. Clubs, they say, are sprouting in the village (karate, cooking, signing), and there are even charity events organised for the poorest (*Aki nem érti*, 2011). For all these signs of prosperity, Érpatak has become a model of sorts for radical-leaning local authorities. Currently, there are about twelve municipalities in the National Network of Érpatak, the purpose of which is to disseminate principles and know-how (*Érpataki Modell Országos*, n.d.).

There is no available academic analysis about the sustainability and effectivity of the model in terms of Roma integration. As a social worker pointed out in one of the articles, many believe that the Érpatak model is only a symptomatic treatment of deeper structural problems (unequal access to education, no way out from public work, and so on) that high fines and daily surveillance might be insufficient to solve. Moreover, a model based on intimidation might compel people to cooperate, but it does not help them understand why it is beneficial to do so (*Robbanáshoz vezethet*, 2011).

¹⁶ *Érpatak Model* is a Duth documentary (2014) created by Benny Brunner and Keno Versec. The trailer can be accessed here: <https://vimeo.com/108058817>

Constituency

Let us look closer at Jobbik constituency in terms of its demographic and socio-economic characteristics.¹⁷

Age: Jobbik constituency is remarkably young. In 2010, 21.2% of its voters were aged 20–29 (in contrast to average voter, where this share is 15.4%), and as the age group of voters increases, the share of Jobbik voters gradually decreases. In the oldest cohort, aged above 69, the proportion of Jobbik voters was a mere 3.9% (average: 11.6%) (Rudas, 2010). Many of the young voters were first time voters, who had not even necessarily graduated from college. The youth of its supporters clearly differentiates Jobbik from most other RWE parties in Europe, where only the Austrian FPÖ and the Greek Golden Dawn have similarly young support base (Róna, 2014, p. 149).

Gender: Similarly to other RWE parties, Jobbik is a traditional “male party.” In 2010, there were twice as many men (13.2%) who voted for Jobbik then women (6.6%) (Rudas, 2010, p. 515). The gender gap is a classical feature of far right parties, especially if they engage in the cult of militarism. This one-sided masculinised image of RWE has been qualified by the work of Anikó Félix, who revealed that women fulfil some important roles within Hungarian extremist sub-culture, for example, acting as “spiritual healers” who mix paganism with nationalist ideologies (Félix, 2012).

Religious beliefs: While most of Jobbik supporters are religious “according to the teaching of the Church” (7.0%) or “in their own way” (54.9%), the proportion of atheists is higher (33.0%) among Jobbik voters than among others (25.6%), which is an interesting finding, given that the party officially defines itself as Christian.

Education: Jobbik voters tend to have average educational attainment. In 2010, 76.9% of its voters had some type of secondary education, be it vocational or high school (average 60.4%) (Rudas, 2010, p. 516). The party had somewhat fewer university graduates than other parties, but also only half the share of voters with elementary education at most than the average of all voters.

Employment: Given the age structure of Jobbik voters, there were fewer pensioners (16.7%) than among all other party voters in average (28.1%). While there were slightly more unemployed Jobbik voters than among mainstream voters, this was counter-balanced by a strong representation of employees (50.6% vs other voters: 40.9%) and entrepreneurs (7.3% vs other voters: 5.4%) in Jobbik.

Income: It is difficult to measure because people are often unwilling to report exact figures about their income. Using a crude binary indicator, Tamás Rudas found that among Jobbik voters there were slightly more people (56.3%) with a monthly personal income above a Euros 233 threshold than among respondents who voted for all other parties in average (54.8%). In absence of more detailed data on voter’s economic positions, Rudas compiled a bundle of resources (such as ownership and size of property, insurance, savings, ownership of various household equipment, and so on) and found that Jobbik voters were consistently better positioned in society than other voters. These and the preceding two characteristics (employment status and education) led Rudas to argue that Jobbik voters cannot be the “losers” in economic transformation, who lost out in the process of modernisation and now have turned to radicalism because of deprivation and unemployment. There are certainly people in much worse situation in society than RWE voters: the undereducated, people who were employed in low value-added economic activities, the elderly, the Roma, the unemployed (see e.g. Ferge, 1996; Kolosi & Tóth, 2008) – they are the real losers of transition, and data indicates that Jobbik voters as such do not belong to the same socio-economic class.

¹⁷ Unless noted otherwise, the data in this section is from Rudas (2010).

Geographic region: The above conclusion is somewhat qualified by András Kovács, who disaggregated party preferences according to regions (Kovács, 2013). He observed that in 2010, there were considerable regional differences in the distribution of Jobbik votes in the Hungary: in some regions the party gained much better results than other parties. In the North-Eastern regions of Hungary, where there is high unemployment and a significant Roma population, Jobbik received 23-27% of votes and was the second strongest party. In the Western regions it obtained less than 15%, whereas in the capital 11% of votes made it the smallest party which passed the parliamentary threshold. Kovács found that in the East, Jobbik voters tended to be more affluent than their peers, but in the Western part of Hungary most of them came from a poorer and working class background (Kovács, 2013, p. 230). All in all, the electorate of Jobbik is highly differentiated, which suggests there might be more than one story as to why one comes to support Jobbik with a particular socio-demographic background.

Competing explanations for the rise of Jobbik

One of the most researched, though still vexing questions about RWE parties, is why their popularity rises at one point in time but not at another. The question is even more puzzling in the CEE context as many of the factors most frequently cited causing the rise of RWE, such as economic crises and sizeable Roma population, seem to be similarly present in the case of other countries in the region as well, while the degree of support for RWE parties varies considerably. This section provides an overview of factors that have been researched with respect to the rise of Jobbik in 2009 and 2010, and focus on prejudice in society, political crises, the role of media and the internet.

Surveys have indicated that the level of prejudice towards minorities is very high in Hungary. Anikó Bernát and her colleagues surveyed public attitudes towards Roma from 1994 to 2011 (Bernát, 2013). Their findings show that most people agreed with the statement that “inclination to criminality is in the blood of Gypsies” (between 53-64%), or that “the problem of Gypsies would be solved if they finally started working” (78-89%). What is conspicuous about these results is not only the high share of people agreeing with anti-Roma statements, but, as the minimum values indicate in the brackets, the resilience of these attitudes over time. Péter Krekó and his colleagues also confirm in their study the high proportion of Hungarian prejudice in the European context (Krekó, 2012). The authors use European Social Survey (ESS) data to compare different countries, and find that the level of prejudice and welfare chauvinism was one of the highest (52%) in Hungary in 2009.¹⁸ Table 2 shows the proportion of prejudice and welfare chauvinism in Hungary, although fluctuates but is higher than in the other Visegrad countries.

While the level of prejudice towards minorities might be a good indicator of people’s receptivity to RWE attitudes in the country, it tells us very little about why the breakthrough of Jobbik happened in 2009. Classical theories often associate the rise of the far right with the economic decline or the crisis of welfare state. The argument suggests that in times of crises and high unemployment, impoverished people tend to choose radical parties who promise better future and more just society (Bell, 1955; Lipset, 1960). In consent with these assumptions some authors (e.g. Grajczár & Tóth, 2011) emphasise the role of the economic and financial crisis – which just culminated in 2009 – in the rise of support for Jobbik. But given our knowledge about the electorate of Jobbik, the majority of whom have a better standard of living than the average and do not tend to be undereducated, it

¹⁸ Prejudice refers to homosexuals and was measured by the question: “Gay and lesbian women should be left as free as possible to live their own lives as they wish.” The welfare chauvinism indicator refers to attitudes towards immigrants and was measured by a series of questions whether “letting immigrants into the country enriches the culture?” or “How many foreigners of non-Hungarian ethnicity would you allow to settle in the country?” etc.. The ESS questions do not refer to Roma because they do not live everywhere in Europe and therefore it would be difficult to compare results. The attitude towards the migrants index shows well the degree of “This country belongs to X nation” way of thinking.

can be suggested that the economic thesis should be treated with caution. What differentiated Hungary from other countries in the region was that, between 2006 and 2010, there was also an acute political crisis. This started with an infamous speech at Balatonőszöd, an internal meeting where Ferenc Gyurcsány, PM and the leader of the socialist MSZP party admitted to members of his parliamentary party that they had lied to people. The speech leaked in the media and led to a scandal which culminated in riots and the siege of the headquarters of the state television in 2006, an event in the organisation of which prominent RWE leaders took an active part. The leadership of MSZP faced some further corruption cases and had to pass austerity measures counter to their electoral promises in the government. It resulted in the popularity of the PM plummeting from 55% in 2006 to 16% in 2009, a drop which has been described as the greatest fall of voter confidence in the history of Hungary since the regime change (Beck, Bíró Nagy, & Róna, 2011, p. 205). The dramatic decline of the left created a vacuum in the previous two-party system in Hungary, and a window of opportunity for smaller parties to vie for the support of disenchanted voters.¹⁹ Moreover, there was not only dissatisfaction among socialist voters, but a wider distrust in the population and a growth of anti-establishment attitudes towards public institutions and the political system in general. As Graph 2 shows, anti-establishment attitudes had been constantly on the rise since 2002 to culminate in 2009 (at 46%).²⁰ The fermenting dissatisfaction of the system created a fertile ground for Jobbik, which represented a strong anti-establishment position among political parties.²¹

Table 2. Prejudice and Welfare Chauvinism in Visegrad Group (V4) countries

Countries	Prejudice and Welfare Chauvinism					
	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013
CR	25	34	-	32	36	32
Hungary	37	46	55	52	49	45
Poland	20	25	18	17	16	18
Slovakia	-	27	26	33	36	39

Source: DEREK Index: <http://derexindex.eu/>

Up to 2009, there were a number of conflicts, even homicides between Roma and non-Roma that were widely medialised. In 2006 at Olaszliszka (a small village in Borsod county) a Hungarian driver accidentally hit a Roma child by car, after which an angry Roma crowd killed him out of revenge. One year later Jobbik (still a marginal party) established the Hungarian Guard with the stated purpose of ensuring order and security by eliminating or deterring criminals. In 2009 January, the police chief in Miskolc said that the majority of criminals were Roma. The Minister of the Interior removed him from office, but, sensing growing public dissatisfaction with the removal of a popular police chief, the Minister rehabilitated him. The most salient event, as indicated by Graph 1 on "Gypsy-crime" (sec. 4), happened a month later, when Marian Cozma, a popular handball player, was killed by few Roma in a disco in Veszprém. In the same month, a Roma family was attacked in Tatárszentgyörgy (small village in the Borsod county): the father and his five-year-old son were killed by Hungarian perpetrators. These assassinations received enormous media coverage and put the Roma issue into the spotlight in Hungary. It was quite favourable to Jobbik, even though their representatives received very little coverage.


¹⁹ According to Median Opinion and Market Research Institute about 14-26% of Jobbik voters in 2009 had voted in 2006 for the socialist MSZP party (*Utóélet*, 2009).

²⁰ The anti-establishment indicator is composed of questions that measure trust and satisfaction in the political system, international bodies (EU, UN), law enforcement bodies and the political elite (Krekó, Juhász & Molnár, 2012).

²¹ Politics Can Be Different (Lehet Más a Politika -- LMP) was another anti-establishment party that emerged on the left at the time (2009). Their support, however, remained lower (between 5-7%). One of the reasons might be that in Hungary, progressive leftism has weaker tradition than national-conservatism.

Examining the agenda-setting function of the leading media outlets, Gergely Karácsony and Dániel Róna show the increasing salience of Roma issues in the mainstream media between 2006 and 2009 (2011). Their findings are all the more interesting because the coverage of these events was largely liberally framed (emphasising poverty and human rights issues rather than scapegoating), though the framing had little impact on public deep-seated prejudice and preconception about Roma. The authors confirm a classical tenet of media theory ("secondary agenda setting function"), namely that the media "may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling people what to think about" (Cohen, 1963). Hence, whenever the media picked up the Roma topic, Karácsony and Róna argue, they benefited Jobbik, because the party created ownership over the issue (Karácsony - Róna 2011).²²

Graph 2. Anti-establishment attitudes in V4 countries, 2003-2013



Source: DEREK Index: <http://derexindex.eu/>

The lack of Jobbik's presence in mainstream media proved to be both a curse and blessing for the party. It was established in the early 2003, just at the time when the internet boom started. Because the party representatives were excluded from the mainstream media, they were forced from very early on to create alternative publicity for which the internet offered excellent opportunities. Using network analysis, Judit Bakó and her colleagues show how previously isolated RWE online communities found each other online and increased with Jobbik over time (Bakó, 2012). The authors map a wide network of some 300 actors, including, in addition to RWE political actors, news and history, rock music bands and publishing companies, online shops and fashion sites, which constitute a closed world, where the sites only link to each other.²³ Bakó and her colleagues argue that in the case of RWE, the internet did not open up communities towards the outside world and establish a more democratic society. Quite on the contrary, the self-referentially cross-linked and increasingly diversified contents created an even more closely knit, "colourful but externally closed

²² In 2009, 19% of people believed Jobbik was the party that could best handle the Roma issue (in contrast to Fidesz: 56%, MSZP: 8%), whereas only 8% of people said they would vote for it (Fidesz: 56%, MSZP: 8%), which shows that the popularity of Jobbik Roma policy went well beyond that of the party (Karácsony & Róna, 2011, p. 78).

²³ The only exception from these are the category of online shops, where market competition between rival outlets overwrites ideological agreement (Bakó, Tóth, & Bakó, 2012, p. 95).

micro-world” (Bakó, 2012, p. 98). This process was more of a self-generating one and certainly not created by Jobbik, but consciously or intuitively, they managed to exploit very well the potential in these sprawling networks.

This section has argued that the key factors that facilitated the breakthrough of Jobbik in 2009 were a high level of prejudice in society, ongoing political crises, and the role of mainstream and alternative media. We do not discuss classical modernisation theories here, partly, because Jobbik voters are not the poorest in society, and partly, because an emphasis on the economic crises would not help us understand what made Hungary different from other CEE countries also affected by the global economic crises. The section relied mostly on demands-centred theories (voter attitudes) and tried, to an extent, to incorporate supply-centred ones (availability of parties) as well.

Conclusion

The case study highlights the characteristic features of Hungarian RWE between 2003– 2014. Where comparative data was available, it notes national specificities in the EU and CEE context.

The main findings are as follows:

RWE is an ambiguous concept. What best characterises the ideology of Jobbik is its anti-establishment position, which is reflected both in its maintenance of a paramilitary organisation and vocal aggression towards the Roma minority. Paramilitary organisations and paternalism are key features that differentiate RWE in CEE from its Western counterparts. Anti-minority rhetoric, on the other hand, is a feature that is shared across all other EU RWE, just as is law and order and anti-EU position.

The political party Jobbik was founded in 2003 and grew out of a university student movement founded in Budapest in 1999. It first passed the Parliamentary threshold in 2010 (16.7% of votes), and further increased in popularity (to 20%) in 2014. Gábor Vona, the chairman of Jobbik, established the Hungarian Guard, a paramilitary organisation in 2007 with a stated aim to deter or eliminate criminals. Because it was involved in instigating anti-Roma violence, the Hungarian Guard was banned by court decision in 2009, but immediately reconstituted itself under slightly different name (New Hungarian Guard). Partly due to the exclusion from the mainstream media, Jobbik and RWE actors were forced to develop a strong online presence. The most popular RWE news portal, kuruc.info, has a long track record of hate speech and privacy violations. Yet the site cannot be shut down because it is operated on US servers and enjoys extensive protection of freedom of speech. The cases of the Hungarian Guard and kuruc.info demonstrate the limited capacity of legal means to effectively counter RWE.

The strong presence of RWE has exerted a significant influence on Hungarian public life. Although Jobbik is in the opposition, it managed to set the political agenda for the Fidesz government since 2010. Eight out of the first ten measures on Jobbik electoral programme in 2010 have already been implemented by Fidesz. RWE has redefined the way Roma are talked about and mainstreamed the expression “Gypsy-crime” in Hungarian public discourse. On a local level a strict law-and-order-based approach have been popularised in RWE-controlled municipalities, and paramilitary organisations are used for intimidating Roma in the rural areas, where law enforcement is weak or has failed. By all these activities Jobbik and related RWE organisations have contributed to the radicalisation of Hungarian politics.

Jobbik electorate is remarkably young and relatively well off, which seems to differentiate it from most RWE parties in Europe. Jobbik voters are overrepresented in the age cohort of 20–29. They tend to be educated at an average level, more likely to be employed than other voters with slightly higher

income. Geographically, the party enjoys the highest support in the North-East of Hungary, characterised by high unemployment and a significant Roma population. Demographic data thus provide a mixed picture about Jobbik appeal for the electorate. On one hand, the party seems to be popular in poorer areas, with its greater competition for scarce resources. On the other hand, the national voter base of party is clearly more complex, as it involves many young, middle class and educated people as well.

The breakthrough of Jobbik in 2009 can be best explained by the high level of prejudice in society and the political (rather than economic) crises the country underwent from 2006 on. The demise of the left not only created a vacuum in the political system, but increased general distrust and anti-establishment values in the society, both of which were quite favourable to Jobbik. The media coverage of Roma conflicts helped to prime people about the importance of Jobbik favourite item on agenda, and despite limited coverage Jobbik officials received in mainstream media, they were effective at keeping in touch with their electorate through alternative media channels.

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Szabó, Gabriella & Bene, Márton (2015): *Mainstream or an alternate universe? Locating and analysing the radical right media products in the Hungarian media network*. In: *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*, 1(1). Retrieved from <http://intersections.tk.mta.hu/index.php/intersections/article/view/30>

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Annotated bibliography on Hungarian right-wing extremism in English

Accelerating Patterns of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungary. (2014, February). François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, Harvard School of Public Health and Harvard University. Retrieved from <http://fxb.harvard.edu>

The François-Xavier Bagnoud (FXB) Center is a US university-based awareness-raising group on issues of human rights. It collected data and recounts instances of prejudice, hate speech and hate crime against the Roma community in the past five years in Hungary. The report makes recommendations to the UN and other IGOs how to tackle discrimination, extremism and escalating violence against Roma.

Athena Institute. (n.d.). Identified domestic extremist groups. Retrieved from http://www.athenainstitute.eu/en/hate_groups/

The Athena Institute is a Budapest-based research organisation on extremism and terrorism. The website collects information on the background, size and recent activities of RWE groups in Hungary.

Balogh S., E. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://hungarianspectrum.org/author/esbalogh/>

The Hungarian Spectrum is a blog in English language featuring daily analysis of Hungarian news -- political, economic and cultural. Its primary pundit, Eva S. Balogh is a former teacher of East European history at Yale University.

Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J., & Littler, M. (2011). *The new face of digital populism*. Demos. Retrieved from <http://clock.uclan.ac.uk/11108/>

Researchers at a British think tank, Demos and a Hungarian consultancy firm Political Capital surveyed about 2,200 Jobbik Facebook fans in terms of their political behaviour, demographic and attitudinal characteristics. The obtained data was compared to offline data about Jobbik voters. The authors found that identity and its protection were key drivers of support of Jobbik.

Bernát, A., Juhász, A., Krekó, P., & Molnár, C. (n.d.). The roots of radicalism and anti-Roma attitudes on the far right. Retrieved from

http://www.tarki.hu/en/news/2013/items/20130305_bernata_juhasz_kreko_molnar.pdf

The authors, analysts at Political Capital, examine attitudes and socio-economic variables that determine far-right affiliation in Hungary.

Bíró Nagy, A., Boros, T., & Varga, Á. (2012, December). Right-wing Extremism in Hungary. Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

The authors, analysts at Political Solutions, examine the political orientation, social bases and impact of Jobbik on other political parties. The authors also make proposals to counter RWE.

Bíró Nagy, A., Boros, T., & Vasali, Z. (2013). More Radical than the Radicals: the Jobbik Party in international comparison. In R. Melzer & S. Serafin (Eds.), *Right-wing extremism in Europe: country analyses, counter-strategies and labor-market oriented exit strategies* (pp. 229–255). Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Forum Berlin.

The authors, analysts at Political Solution, discuss Jobbik's ideology in the European context and present its impact on other political parties in Hungary. The book contains a number of case studies from other European countries and discusses national and European level counter-strategies.

Enyedi, Z., Fábián, Z., & Sík, E. (2005). Is prejudice is growing in Hungary? TÁRKI Social Report Reprint Series No 21. Retrieved from <http://www.tarki.hu/>

The authors, researchers at TÁRKI Group and the Central European University, examine how anti-Semitism, anti-Roma and anti-foreigner attitudes have changed in Hungary from the 1990s to 2004.

Fomina, V. (2013). Mapping the Network of Hungarian Extremist Groups. Retrieved from http://athenaintezet.hu/uploaded_docs/52b477c120a78.pdf

The author, non-resident fellow at Athena Institute, maps the threat level as well as relations between seventeen domestic extremist groups operating in Hungary.

Kállai, E. (n.d.). Summary of the report on the follow-up investigation of the Ombudsman for National and Ethnic Minority Rights on public employment, the practices of authorities dealing with minor offenses and the education situation in Gyöngyöspata (Hungary). Retrieved from <http://tasz.hu>

The author, Ombudsman for National and Ethnic Minority Rights, reports about the situation in Gyöngyöspata in terms of public employment, educational segregation and official follow-up investigations by the police and the local government

Karácsony, G., & Róna, D. (2011). Reasons behind the rise of Hungarian radical right. *Journal of East European and Asian Studies*, 2(1), 61–93.

The authors, a professor and a lecturer from Corvinus University, use content analysis to explain the rise of Jobbik in 2009. They find that anti-establishment and anti-Roma attitudes were significant markers of preference for Jobbik, and that the media contributed to the success of party by highlighting issues related to Roma population.

Kovács, A. (2013). The Post-Communist Extreme Right: The Jobbik Party in Hungary. In R. Wodak, M. KhosraviNik, & B. Mral (Eds.), *Right-Wing Populism in Europe*. London: Bloomsbury.

The author, researcher at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, analyses the constituency, ideological orientation, and structural causes of the rise of Jobbik.

Saltman, E. M. (2014). *Turning right: A case study on contemporary political socialization of the Hungarian youth*. UCL (University College London). Retrieved from <http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1427437/>

The author analyses the political socialisation of Hungarian youth in her PhD thesis

Sik, D. (2015). Incubating radicalism in Hungary—the case of Sopron and Ózd. *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*, 1(1). Retrieved from <http://intersections.tk.mta.hu/index.php/intersections/article/view/31>

The author, professor at ELTE University, uses semi-structured interviews (n=60) to analyse young people's political attitudes and behaviour in two settlements (Ózd, Sopron). The paper attempts to outline typologies for the RWE political culture of the youth.

Szabó, G., & Bene, M. (2015). Mainstream or an alternate universe? Locating and analysing the radical right media products in the Hungarian media network. *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*, 1(1). Retrieved from <http://intersections.tk.mta.hu/index.php/intersections/article/view/30>

The authors, researchers at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, use network analysis to examine the position of RWE media within the network structure of the general media space. They conclude that mainstream media reports the products but not the representatives of RWE media.

Vidra, Z. & Fox, J. (2012). The rise of the extreme right in Hungary and the Roma question - The radicalization of media discourse. Retrieved from <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/23402>

The authors, research fellow at the Central European University and lecturer at the University of Bristol, compare the media representation of two ethically motivated murder cases in Hungary: one in which Roma were the perpetrators and non-Roma the victims (Olaszliszka), another in which it was the other way round (Tatárszentgyörgy).

Annotated bibliography on Hungarian right-wing extremism in comparative perspective in English

Feischmidt, M., & Hervik, P. (2015). Mainstreaming the Extreme: Intersecting Challenges from the Far Right in Europe. *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*, 1(1), 3–17. The authors, researchers at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the University of Aalborg (DK), present the discursive practices of European far-right and media to promote the criminalisation of migrants and other minorities.

Félix, A. (2015). Old Missions in New Clothes: The Reproduction of the Nation as Women's Main Role Perceived by Female Supporters of Golden Dawn and Jobbik. *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*, 1(1). Retrieved from <http://intersections.tk.mta.hu/index.php/intersections/article/view/15>

The author, Sociology PhD-student at ELTE University, analyses the gender dimension of far-rights movement in Hungary and Greece. The paper argues that although women support the far right in smaller numbers than men, they nonetheless have a significant input in the growing public support that these parties enjoy.

Mudde, C. (1995). Right-wing extremism analyzed. *European Journal of Political Research*, 27(2), 203–224.

The author, PhD candidate at the University of Leiden, analyses the ideologies of three European RWE parties (NPD, NDP, CP'86). He shows that the ideology of these, so-called "3rd wave of RWE parties" are different from earlier party families of RWE.

Mudde, C. (Ed.). (2005). *Racist extremism in Central and Eastern Europe*. New York: Routledge. The author, professor at the University of Antwerp, compares racist extremist parties in ECE to their counterpart in the West. The paper concludes that contrary to alarming statements on the topic, ECE was not a safe haven for racist extremists before these countries joined the EU.

Norris, P. (2005). *Radical right: voters and parties in the electoral market*. Cambridge University Press. The author, lecturer at the Harvard University, analyses radical right parties in almost forty countries. She uses supply-demand theory to explain why these parties advanced in certain countries but not in others.

Pirro, A. (2015). *The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, impact, and electoral performance*. New York: Routledge. Retrieved from <http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9781138839878/>

The author, a PhD from the University of Siena, compares the ideology, electoral performance and impact of RWE parties in the ECE region. Relying on primary data, the book uses supply-demand theory to argue that RWE parties in ECE are in nature different from their Western counterparts.

Pirro, A. L. (n.d.). Demand and Supply of Post-Communist Issues: Insights into the Electoral Performance of Populist Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Retrieved from http://paperroom.ipsa.org/app/webroot/papers/paper_15943.pdf

The author, PhD candidate at the University of Siena, examines three RWE parties (Ataka, Jobbik, SNS) in ECE. The paper argues that what differentiates these parties from their Western counterparts is the way they address issues of minority rights, corruption and European integration.

Pirro, A. L., & van Kessel, S. (2013). Pushing towards exit: Euro-rejection as a "populist common denominator." In *EUDO Dissemination conference* (pp. 28–29). Retrieved from http://dc-10751-711240033.eu-west-1.elb.amazonaws.com/sites/default/files/68_42_0.pdf

The authors, PhDs at the University in Siena and a lecturer at Loughborough University argue that the positions of the Party of Freedom and Jobbik towards the EU have radicalised in the past years.

Political Capital. (2013). Attitude radicals in Hungary – in international context. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Büro Budapest. Retrieved from <http://www.riskandforecast.com/>

The authors, analysts at Political Capital, examine social demand for far right ideas in Hungary and Europe. The paper concludes that far right attitudes have risen in the West and have declined in some ECE countries. In absolute terms however, demand for RWE ideas is still higher in ECE than in the West.