The Bystander's Dilemma

Minority Responses to Discrimination

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Introduction

Motivation


I CAN'T BREATHE
I CAN'T BREATHE
I CAN'T BREATHE
ERIC GARNER
BLACK LIVES MATTER
I CAN'T BREATHE
LIVES MATTER
NEW YORK
BLACK LIVES MATTER
SAY HER NAME!
BREONNA
STAND UP FOR TRAYVON
JUSTICE RALLY
Freedom Plaza

Motivation

- Racial and ethnic discrimination remains pervasive across, e.g., policing, labor markets, housing, education, healthcare, and criminal justice (Bertrand and Duflo 2017).
  - Victims not isolated, embedded in broader communities that may act in response.
  - Minority individuals frequently bystanders to discrimination, not just its targets.
  - High-profile discriminatory events often trigger social protests (e.g., Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, George Floyd, and Breonna Taylor). Yet response to many other such events muted.
- Intragroup and intergroup minority dynamics understudied in social psychology (Craig and Richerson 2012, Burson and Godfrey 2020). Almost no studies in economics (Dinas, Fouka, Schlaepfer, 2021).
- Does discrimination unite minorities or fragment them? Theory pointing in different directions of bystander responses: harm reversal, apathy, or doubling-down.

Social cohesion and reversing harm?

> *"[C]ompassion is the natural response of their group toward the plight of all sufferers from oppression."*
>
> — *Allport (1954, p. 153-5)*

- Reversing harm caused by wrongdoer?
  - Shared experience of discrimination increasing *empathy* through *collective victimhood* (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017), possibly through *identity recategorization* or *inclusive victimhood* (common inclusive identity of stigma (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio 2014)).
  - *Normative beliefs* about justice may motivate bystanders to reverse or offset the harm.
  - *Moral duty to act* and to oppose discriminatory behavior.

Apathy or doubling-down?

"[V]ictims of prejudice may [...] inflict on others what they themselves receive."

— *Allport (1954, p. 153-5)*

- Apathy? Or doubling down?
  - Experiences of acts of harm erode social norms and moral conduct (Keizer, Lindenberg, Steg 2008).
  - *Moral licensing* (Merritt, Effron, Morin 2010).
    - "Others do it, so why can't I." (or copying noisy norms)
    - "I've suffered too, I don't owe help to others."
  - *Competitive victimhood*: emphasizing own suffering, while resenting the victimhood of others (Noor et al. 2012).
  - *Moral distancing*: "That's not my group's problem." (Opotow 1990).

Apathy or doubling-down?

This is a point of considerable importance. *Victimization can scarcely leave an individual with a merely normal amount of prejudice* Broadly speaking, he will take one of two paths. Either he will join the pecking order and treat others in the way he has been treated, or else he will consciously and deliberately avoid this temptation. With insight he will say, "These people are victims exactly as I am a victim. Better stand with them, not against them."

— *Allport (1954, p. 155)*

Implications

- Measurement: In real-world settings, exposure to discrimination is confounded by differential material incentives, media framing, and selective networks.
  - Isolating causal bystander responses impossible using observational data. Controlled experiment needed.

- Understanding dynamics within and across minority groups is increasingly important in a multiracial society.
  - **"Tipping point".** Racial and ethnic minorities over 40% of the U.S. population and projected a *combined* majority by mid-century (US Census 2015, 2020).
  - Understanding whether discrimination triggers narrow solidarity or broader support, bystander responses determine the potential for cross-minority cooperation and norm enforcement in diverse societies.

Research questions

1. How do minority group members respond when witnessing harm done to another individual, depending on the victim's group identity?
    - Does the presence or absence of a prior wrongdoer affect moral behavior toward a passive "victim"?

2. How does the salience of one's own discrimination experiences affect moral responses to harm against others, depending on the victim's group identity?

This paper

- Online experiment with $N = 4,477$ Black US residents ("bystanders").
- Introducing a Bystander Dilemma Game: Incentivized redistribution task to a victim of injustice perpetrated by a majority group member ("wrongdoer").
- Manipulating ethnic identity of victims.
- Allowing for (costly) anti- and pro-social behavior, and indifference.
- Comparison to a choice-set equivalent modified Dictator Game to differentiate *reactions (social contagion)* from *preferences*.
- Orthogonally priming past discrimination to induce salience of shared experience of discrimination.

Results summary

- Bystanders display ingroup favoritism.
- The presence of a wrongdoer reduces average prosocial behavior but increases polarization. Somewhat more so for Black victims.
- Consistent with competing theories: solidarity (inclusive victimhood) and moral disengagement (licensing, competitive victimhood, disengagement) both being at play, with the latter being dominant.
- Results consistent with loosened social norms in response to observed wrongdoing.

Related literature

- Social contagion of ethnic hostility within majority group (Bauer et al. 2018). **This paper**: focus on intraminority relations.
- Stereotype threat focuses on reaction of individuals to being discriminated against (Steele and Aronson 1995). **This paper**: reaction of bystanders.
- Limited study of intraminority relations in social psychology studying attitudes (Craig and Richerson 2012; Burson and Godfrey 2020). **This paper**: incentivized task to study preferences.
- Collective victimhood and outgroup prejudice using historical quasi-experiments (Dinas, Fouka, Schlaepfer, 2021). **This paper**: Controlled experiment and preference measures.
- Few papers used tasks that contrast pro- and anti-social preferences in individual decisions (Bartos et al. 2021; LaRossignol, Lowes, Nunn 2023). **This paper**: A dynamic setting.

Experimental Design and Sample

Bystander Dilemma Game: Players

Discrimination / Harm

- Three player game:
  - **Player 1**: First mover, White majority
    - ”Wrongdoer” if acting nasty.
  - **Player 2** (”bystander”): **Decision-maker of interest**, Black minority
  - **Player 3** (”victim”): Passive victim, manipulating group identity

    between-subject: **Black, Hispanic, White**

Bystander (Player 2): Details of the Experiment

1. Black US resident Prolific users enter a study on ”economic decision-making” (N=4,477) Summary stats
2. Demographic survey
   - Race (screening Black), country of birth (screening US), age, gender, state/ZIP code, income, religion
   - Length adjusted to keep (survey+prime) length equal.
   - Attention check.
3. Priming discrimination
   - Survey on past experience of discrimination.
   - Order random: **before** or **after** games.
4. Bystander Dilemma and Dictator games
   - Comprehension checks. Expulsion after failing twice (Banki, Simonsohn, Walatka, Wu, 2025).
   - BDG and DG order randomized.
   - Strategy method: Nasty Player 1 (”wrongdoer”) first, kind Player 1 second.
5. Incentivized beliefs about Player 1 action in BDG
6. Memory check: Remembering race of Player 1 and 3.
7. Further demographics questions
   - political views, party identification, etc.

Bystander Dilemma Game: Player 2



You will now allocate money between yourself and Person A.

Bystander Dilemma Game: Player 2



Person B already allocated money between themselves and Person A.

Bystander Dilemma Game: Player 2



Bystander Dilemma Game: Main focus on nasty behavior

Kind

Option 1

This is what Person B could have done.



Option 2

This is what Person B could have done.



Bystander Dilemma Game: Main focus on nasty behavior

Kind

Name	Wrongdoer (Player 1)	Bystander (Player 2)	Victim (Player 3)
Costly very kind	4.5	4.0	4.5
Costly kind	4.5	4.5	4.0
Status-quo	4.5	5.0	3.5
Costless nasty	4.5	5.0	3.0
Costly nasty	4.5	4.5	2.0
Costly very nasty	4.5	4.0	0.5

Table 1: Options available to Player 2 following Player 1 "Harm"

- **Kind options**: maintain efficiency, reduce inequality.
- **Nasty options**: reduce efficiency, increase inequality.
- Order of options randomized at an individual level.

Dictator Game

- All else as in the Bystander Dilemma Game, but Player 1 absent. Choice set equal.
- Allows for comparison between individual preferences and bystander reactions (*social contagion*)

Dictator Game



You will now allocate money between yourself and Person A.

Manipulating P3 (”victim”) group identity

- Direct ethnicity manipulation of P3 identity (as in Bartos et al. 2021; Cappelen, Enke, Tungodden 2025):
- Wording:
  - *In this activity, you will allocate money between yourself and a [Black / Hispanic / White] adult living in the United States (Person A).*
  - *Person A’s payoff has already been affected by the decision of Person B. You will not have a chance to affect the payoff of Person B (a White adult living in the United States), but you will now have a chance to determine the final payoff of Person A (a [Black / Hispanic / White] adult living in the United States).*
- Common knowledge Wording

Priming past experience of discrimination

- Idea: Manipulate salience of past discrimination experience
- Wording (7 questions):
  - *Have you ever experienced discrimination, been treated unfairly, been hassled, or made to feel inferior because of your race or ethnicity [at school / at work / when dealing with public institutions (e.g., police, the court system, social services) / on the internet or social media / on the street or in public / when getting service at a store or restaurant / in the settings above or in others?]*

Beliefs about P1 BDG behavior

- For BDG incentive-compatibility, P2s need to believe that P1 behave anti-socially. They do!
- Wording after reminder of options available to P1: *We randomly selected the choices of 10 Person B which took our study. How many do you think picked Option 2?*
- Answer precision incentivized.



P1 BDG behavior perceived as discrimination

	(1) P2 Beliefs about P1 Harm
Black	0.323***
	(0.091)
Hispanic	0.273***
	(0.092)
Belief White P3	4.226
Clusters	4477
Observations	4477

- P1 harmful acts perceived as discrimination. Higher fraction of P1s expected to treat minority P3 harmfully.
- Supplementary study shows no distinction between explicit harm and explicit discrimination Discrimination / Harm

Experimental procedures

- **Payoff**:
  - Show-up fee: $2.5
  - Incentivized beliefs: $0-$1
  - One game randomly selected. Payments based on matching with actual P1 and P3.
- **Average P2 payoff**: $7.63
- **Average P2 duration**: 22 minutes
- **Additional sampling**: 120 P1s, 120 P3s

Results

Behavior of Black P2s: BDG

White P2

	No Prime				Prime			
	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Nasty	(5) Allocation	(6) Very kind	(7) Kind	(8) Nasty
Black	0.110***	0.113***	0.106***	-0.019	0.215***	0.132***	0.148***	-0.084***
	(0.042)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.019)
Hispanic	0.095**	0.069***	0.072***	-0.036*	0.104**	0.078***	0.071***	-0.030
	(0.040)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.020)
CG White P3	3.633	0.138	0.537	0.184	3.654	0.175	0.543	0.194
Clusters	2242	2242	2242	2242	2235	2235	2235	2235
Observations	2242	2242	2242	2242	2235	2235	2235	2235

1. Ingroup bias, in line with feeling thermometers. Thermometers
2. Priming strengthens ingroup bias.

Behavior of Black P2s

Polarization | Discrimination / Harm

	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Nasty
Black	0.183***	0.0895***	0.102***	-0.0644***
	(7.60)	(6.37)	(6.01)	(-5.36)
Hispanic	0.0843***	0.0512***	0.0648***	-0.0269**
	(3.20)	(3.79)	(3.76)	(-2.10)
Bystander	-0.0753***	0.0192**	-0.0951***	0.0342***
	(-3.42)	(2.11)	(-7.82)	(3.01)
Black*Bystander	-0.0193	0.0333**	0.0254	0.0129
	(-0.64)	(2.32)	(1.49)	(0.84)
Hispanic*Bystander	0.0150	0.0226	0.00706	-0.00641
	(0.49)	(1.63)	(0.42)	(-0.41)
DG White P3	3.719	0.137	0.635	0.155
Clusters	4477	4477	4477	4477
Observations	8954	8954	8954	8954

1. Ingroup bias in DG and BDG, in line with feeling thermometers. Thermometers
2. BDG reduces transfers (moral licensing or disengagement) but increases very kind (moral duty to act) $\rightarrow$ looser social norm and increases polarization?!
3. Somewhat more polarization for Black P3.

Behavior of Black P2s: by Prime

Polarization | Discrimination / Harm

	No Prime				Prime			
	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Nasty	(5) Allocation	(6) Very kind	(7) Kind	(8) Nasty
Black	0.128***	0.072***	0.092***	-0.032*	0.236***	0.106***	0.112***	-0.097***
	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.017)
Hispanic	0.036	0.055***	0.055**	-0.001	0.133***	0.047**	0.074***	-0.053***
	(0.037)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Bystander	-0.098***	0.019	-0.093***	0.042***	-0.052*	0.019	-0.097***	0.026
	(0.032)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Black*Bystander	-0.019	0.041**	0.014	0.013	-0.021	0.025	0.037	0.013
	(0.046)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Hispanic*Bystander	0.059	0.014	0.017	-0.035	-0.030	0.031	-0.003	0.023
	(0.045)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.043)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)
DG White P3	3.731	0.119	0.631	0.142	3.706	0.155	0.640	0.168
Clusters	2242	2242	2242	2242	2235	2235	2235	2235
Observations	4484	4484	4484	4484	4470	4470	4470	4470

1. Priming strengthens ingroup bias.
2. Priming mutes transfer reduction (moral licensing or disengagement) but no differential increases in very kind (moral duty to act) $\rightarrow$ priming somewhat mutes polarization?!
3. Somewhat more polarization for Black P3 when not primed.

Robustness checks

- Social desirability bias: Unlikely to drive results as baseline discrimination level high (we would expect discrimination to be small).
- Attention: 95 percent of participants get both attention checks right.
  - Results robust to restricting to attentive sample. Regression
- Race salience: 91 (92) percent of participants remember correctly race of P1 (P3), respectively.
  - Results robust to restricting to those who remember. Regression
- Consistency: Behavior across games rather consistent within individuals (very few extreme transitions such as extreme kind to extreme nasty). Flow diagram
- Generalizability: No major differences by Political views Education Income, results symmetric for Hispanic P2s Hispanic P2
- Validity: Data valid. Self-reported demographics match Prolific records (age +/-1 year 96.25 percent match, gender 97.18 percent match).

Norms Elicitation: Experimental Design and Sample

- Goal: Measure **injunctive** and **descriptive** norms (Krupka & Weber 2013) for the BDG and the DG.
- Tasks: For each game, respondents (US adults on Prolific, N=1,000) evaluate every available P2 action:
  - *Injunctive:* 4-point social appropriateness scale; guess modal response.
  - *Descriptive:* Estimate how many out of randomly drawn 100 P2s would choose each option.
- Design:
  - Both measures *incentivized* using a simple scoring rule.
  - Within-subject, order of games randomized (DG vs. BDG first)
  - Group memberships fixed to: P1 White, P2/P3 Black

Injunctive Norms: Results (first decisions) Appendix



- Comprehension: Nasty behavior perceived as less appropriate, comprehension questions.
- Norms looser under BDG: DG first order stochastically dominates BDG
  - In line with increased polarization.
- Robustness checks: stability under different specifications, comprehension questions, demographics.

Descriptive Norms: Results (first decisions)



Misperceptions: In reality...

- Kind behavior more prevalent in general
- Nasty behavior less prevalent in general
- Increased nastiness and very kind behavior under BDG

Conclusions

Conclusions

- We study reactions of Black U.S. residents to witnessing harm toward others, manipulating the presence of a wrongdoer, the victim's group identity, and the salience of past discrimination.
  - P2s display ingroup favoritism.
  - Observed wrongdoing destabilizes norms, amplifying both solidaristic and antisocial responses. Somewhat more so for Black victims.
  - Priming discrimination mutes this polarization—suggesting both empathy for fellow minorities and moral distancing from others.
- Findings are consistent with competing theories: solidarity (inclusive victimhood) and moral disengagement (licensing, competitive victimhood, disengagement) both being at play, with the later being dominant.
- Intraminority moral responses in multiracial societies are complex. Inclusive victimhood–important for coalition formation–unlikely to dominate.

Thank you for your comments!

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Summary statistics

Design details

	Mean (1)	SD (2)
Age	36.736	(12.383)
Male (d)	0.372	(0.483)
No schooling	0.001	(0.033)
School dropout	0.003	(0.054)
High school graduate	0.112	(0.316)
College or some college	0.581	(0.493)
After Bachelor's Degree	0.303	(0.460)
Less than $15,000	0.115	(0.319)
$15,000 - $25,000	0.082	(0.274)
$25,000 - $50,000	0.235	(0.424)
$50,000 - $75,000	0.231	(0.421)
$75,000 - $100,000	0.151	(0.358)
$100,000 - $125,000	0.065	(0.247)
$125,000 - $150,000	0.046	(0.210)
More than $150,000	0.046	(0.211)
Observations	4477	

Common knowledge in the experiment

Treatments

- Person B (a White adult living in the United States):
  - knows the rules of the game.
  - has the same information as you do about person A.
  - knows that you are aware of their decision.
  - does not know anything about you, other than that you are a real human.
- Person A (a [Black / Hispanic / White] adult living in the United States) will:
  - know the rules of the game,
  - see the decisions you and Person B will have made,
  - not know anything about you or Person B, other than that you are real humans.

Explicit discrimination and harm Design Beliefs

- Study testing if behavior of P1 perceived by P2 as **discrimination** or **harm** (N=2,223)
- Black US citizens recruited on Prolific
- Procedure as in Main Experiment
- P2 decisions after learning about P1 behavior towards a majority White P3 and a [Black / Hispanic / White] P3. Within-subject:
  1. Explicit harm: both P3s harmed
  2. Explicit discrimination: [Black / Hispanic / White] P3 harmed, White P3s not
- **Incentive compatibility:** Beliefs of P2s about either P1 behavior strictly positive: participants believe behavior happened.
  - Most (40%) correctly expect P1s do not harm either P3.

Explicit discrimination and harm

Design Beliefs



You will now allocate money between yourself and Person A.

Explicit discrimination and harm

Design Beliefs



Person B already allocated money between themselves and Person A and C.

Explicit discrimination and harm

Design Beliefs



Explicit discrimination and harm: signaling harm

Design Beliefs









Explicit discrimination and harm

Results

	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Nasty
Black	0.160***	0.141***	0.126***	-0.057***
	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.016)
Hispanic	0.151***	0.134***	0.113***	-0.058***
	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.016)
ExpHarm	-0.049**	0.052***	-0.088***	0.006
	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Black*ExpHarm	0.046	0.036*	0.027	0.012
	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Hispanic*ExpHarm	-0.018	-0.007	-0.009	0.045**
	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)
ExpDisc	-0.040	0.060***	-0.082***	0.017
	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Black*ExpDisc	0.039	0.048**	0.039*	0.001
	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Hispanic*ExpDisc	0.027	0.010	0.009	0.003
	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)
DG White P3	3.767	0.099	0.649	0.136
Black p-value	0.828	0.518	0.548	0.561
Hispanic p-value	0.156	0.358	0.371	0.031
Clusters	2223	2223	2223	2223
Observations	6669	6669	6669	6669

1. Behavior not different between explicit harm and explicit discrimination.
2. $\rightarrow$ Harmful actions perceived as discriminatory in general.

Explicit discrimination and harm: By Prime

Results: Prime

	No Prime				Prime			
	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Nasty	(5) Allocation	(6) Very kind	(7) Kind	(8) Nasty
Black	0.113***	0.134***	0.111***	-0.037	0.204***	0.148***	0.140***	-0.075***
	(0.041)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.022)
Hispanic	0.124***	0.127***	0.120***	-0.044*	0.178***	0.141***	0.107***	-0.072***
	(0.040)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.023)
ExpHarm	-0.082**	0.049***	-0.101***	0.023	-0.017	0.054***	-0.075***	-0.011
	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Black*ExpHarm	0.064	0.017	0.025	-0.002	0.030	0.053**	0.029	0.025
	(0.049)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.027)
Hispanic*ExpHarm	0.015	0.010	-0.001	0.033	-0.049	-0.024	-0.016	0.055*
	(0.050)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.053)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.031)
ExpDisc	-0.094***	0.040**	-0.104***	0.032	0.009	0.078***	-0.062***	0.003
	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Black*ExpDisc	0.095*	0.060**	0.070**	-0.013	-0.013	0.036	0.011	0.014
	(0.052)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.030)
Hispanic*ExpDisc	0.091*	0.053*	0.026	-0.013	-0.034	-0.034	-0.006	0.018
	(0.050)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.030)
DG White P3	3.786	0.095	0.642	0.124	3.749	0.102	0.656	0.148
Black p-value	0.514	0.094	0.151	0.690	0.340	0.521	0.479	0.673
Hispanic p-value	0.086	0.064	0.366	0.097	0.758	0.737	0.722	0.179
Clusters	1099	1099	1099	1099	1124	1124	1124	1124
Observations	3297	3297	3297	3297	3372	3372	3372	3372

Feeling thermometers

Robustness

	(1) Total	(2) Lib	(3) Mod/Con	(2)-(3) Pairwise t-test
Thermometer Black	8.570	8.895	8.153	0.742***
	(0.140)	(0.148)	(0.250)	
Thermometer Hispanic	7.178	7.197	7.153	0.045
	(0.183)	(0.221)	(0.310)	
Thermometer White	6.467	6.092	6.949	-0.857*
	(0.223)	(0.308)	(0.312)	
Number of observations	135	76	59	135

Behavior of Black P2s: Polarization

Results Results: Prime

1. Dependent variable: Indicator "extreme" for either very kind or very nasty behavior.

	(1) All	(2) No Prime	(3) Prime
Black	0.025	0.040*	0.010
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Hispanic	0.024	0.054**	-0.006
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Complicity	0.053***	0.061***	0.046**
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Black*Complicity	0.046**	0.055**	0.038
	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Hispanic*Complicity	0.016	-0.021	0.054*
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.028)
DG White P3	0.292	0.261	0.323
Clusters	4477	2242	2235
Observations	8954	4484	4470

1. BDG increases polarization.
2. Somewhat more for Black P3s. No major differences by priming, though!

Behavior of White P2s

Black P2 BDG

	No Prime				Prime			
	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Nasty	(5) Allocation	(6) Very kind	(7) Kind	(8) Nasty
Black	0.098	0.075	0.043	-0.024	0.164**	0.202***	0.114**	-0.017
	(0.070)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.026)	(0.070)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.030)
Hispanic	0.058	0.064	0.012	-0.005	0.184***	0.186***	0.066	-0.051*
	(0.071)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.027)	(0.064)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.027)
Bystander	-0.033	0.026	-0.072**	0.039	-0.000	0.110***	-0.055*	0.048
	(0.050)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.050)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Black*Bystander	-0.131	0.009	-0.033	0.072*	0.000	-0.068	0.013	-0.018
	(0.083)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.070)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.038)
Hispanic*Bystander	-0.034	0.022	-0.025	0.021	-0.067	-0.059	-0.021	0.003
	(0.074)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.073)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.040)
DG White P3	3.842	0.184	0.691	0.066	3.803	0.152	0.634	0.083
Clusters	460	460	460	460	469	469	469	469
Observations	920	920	920	920	938	938	938	938

1. Priming discrimination induces minority-favoritism.
   - Discrimination perceived low among White P2s: 72% report never being discriminated, compared to 21% of Black P2s.
   - Not shown: driven by Democratic voters.
2. BDG reduces kindness and increases nasty behavior against Blacks (overall significant in pooled regression)
3. Increased polarization under Prime.

Behavior of Black P2s: Attentive sample

Robustness

	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Nasty
Black	0.172***	0.085***	0.099***	-0.061***
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.012)
Hispanic	0.081***	0.051***	0.065***	-0.027**
	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.013)
Bystander	-0.076***	0.018*	-0.096***	0.034***
	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Black*Bystander	-0.018	0.034**	0.027	0.011
	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Hispanic*Bystander	0.013	0.022	0.009	-0.004
	(0.030)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)
DG White P3	3.732	0.138	0.639	0.151
Clusters	4263	4263	4263	4263
Observations	8526	8526	8526	8526

- Wording:
  - *Attention check: choose "Somewhat agree." [Likert scale]*
  - *What is correct? [I will now answer standard survey questions about myself / I will now make decisions that affect my and someone else's financial reward / The survey ends after this question]*

Behavior of Black P2s: Sample remembering race

Robustness

	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Nasty
Black	0.183***	0.092***	0.105***	-0.067***
	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.012)
Hispanic	0.100***	0.059***	0.071***	-0.034**
	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.013)
Bystander	-0.079***	0.021**	-0.092***	0.032***
	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Black*Bystander	-0.024	0.032**	0.018	0.017
	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Hispanic*Bystander	0.019	0.025*	0.008	-0.005
	(0.031)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.016)
DG White P3	3.731	0.136	0.639	0.151
Clusters	3933	3933	3933	3933
Observations	7866	7866	7866	7866

- Wording:
  - *What was the race or ethnicity of Person A in the activities where we asked you to allocate money?*
  - *What was the race or ethnicity of Person B in the activities where we asked you to allocate money?*

Flow diagram (DG-BDG): Black P3 Robustness



Flow diagram (DG-BDG): Hispanic P3 Robustness



Flow diagram (DG-BDG): White P3

Robustness



Behavior of Black P2s: by Beliefs about P1 behavior

	Belief 1-4				Belief 5-10			
	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Nasty	(5) Allocation	(6) Very kind	(7) Kind	(8) Nasty
Black	0.202***	0.102***	0.138***	-0.077***	0.178***	0.084***	0.068***	-0.059***
	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Hispanic	0.046	0.044**	0.030	-0.015	0.099**	0.045**	0.071***	-0.029
	(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.042)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Bystander	-0.061**	0.020*	-0.078***	0.036**	-0.098***	0.020	-0.120***	0.038**
	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Black*Bystander	-0.054	0.007	-0.027	0.030	0.024	0.058**	0.084***	-0.002
	(0.041)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.049)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Hispanic*Bystander	0.048	0.035*	0.012	-0.019	-0.001	0.013	0.018	-0.004
	(0.042)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.050)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.023)
DG White P3	3.729	0.124	0.620	0.146	3.716	0.160	0.673	0.165
Clusters	1967	1967	1967	1967	2201	2201	2201	2201
Observations	3934	3934	3934	3934	4402	4402	4402	4402

Behavior of Black P2s: by Political views

Robustness

	Moderate/Conservative				Liberal			
	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Bad	(5) Allocation	(6) Very kind	(7) Kind	(8) Bad
Black	0.128***	0.072***	0.092***	-0.032*	0.236***	0.106***	0.112***	-0.097***
	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.017)
Hispanic	0.036	0.055***	0.055**	-0.001	0.133***	0.047**	0.074***	-0.053***
	(0.037)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Bystander	-0.098***	0.019	-0.093***	0.042***	-0.052*	0.019	-0.097***	0.026
	(0.032)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Black*Bystander	-0.019	0.041**	0.014	0.013	-0.021	0.025	0.037	0.013
	(0.046)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Hispanic*Bystander	0.059	0.014	0.017	-0.035	-0.030	0.031	-0.003	0.023
	(0.045)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.043)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)
DG White P3	3.731	0.119	0.631	0.142	3.706	0.155	0.640	0.168
Clusters	2242	2242	2242	2242	2235	2235	2235	2235
Observations	4484	4484	4484	4484	4470	4470	4470	4470

Behavior of Black P2s: by Education

Robustness

	Up to college				After BA			
	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Nasty	(5) Allocation	(6) Very kind	(7) Kind	(8) Nasty
Black	0.198***	0.091***	0.107***	-0.070***	0.147***	0.085***	0.089***	-0.051**
	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.048)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Hispanic	0.105***	0.059***	0.071***	-0.030**	0.039	0.034	0.051	-0.020
	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.025)
Bystander	-0.068***	0.022**	-0.099***	0.036***	-0.092**	0.014	-0.087***	0.030
	(0.024)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.047)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Black*Bystander	-0.043	0.026	0.025	0.017	0.036	0.050**	0.027	0.003
	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.063)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Hispanic*Bystander	0.012	0.021	0.016	-0.012	0.022	0.027	-0.013	0.007
	(0.034)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.065)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.031)
DG White P3	3.735	0.140	0.644	0.145	3.682	0.130	0.614	0.178
Clusters	3121	3121	3121	3121	1356	1356	1356	1356
Observations	6242	6242	6242	6242	2712	2712	2712	2712

Behavior of Black P2s: by Income

Robustness

	Up to 50k				More than 50k			
	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Nasty	(5) Allocation	(6) Very kind	(7) Kind	(8) Nasty
Black	0.163***	0.069***	0.109***	-0.055***	0.206***	0.102***	0.094***	-0.079***
	(0.037)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Hispanic	0.101**	0.038*	0.085***	-0.023	0.083**	0.053***	0.046*	-0.035*
	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Bystander	-0.080**	0.005	-0.094***	0.041**	-0.065**	0.026**	-0.101***	0.026*
	(0.031)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Black*Bystander	0.017	0.031	0.022	-0.007	-0.063	0.038**	0.030	0.037*
	(0.043)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.044)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.022)
Hispanic*Bystander	0.025	0.024	0.001	-0.025	-0.013	0.024	0.014	0.014
	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.044)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.022)
DG White P3	3.759	0.175	0.656	0.138	3.681	0.110	0.620	0.173
Clusters	1934	1934	1934	1934	2412	2412	2412	2412
Observations	3868	3868	3868	3868	4824	4824	4824	4824

Behavior of Hispanic P2s: Exp. discrimination and harm

Robustness

	(1) Allocation	(2) Very kind	(3) Kind	(4) Nasty
Black	0.097*	0.073*	0.077*	-0.040
	(0.057)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.027)
Hispanic	0.166***	0.113***	0.089**	-0.061**
	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.025)
ExpHarm	-0.095*	0.058**	-0.107***	0.044
	(0.052)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.027)
Black*ExpHarm	0.041	-0.032	0.045	0.003
	(0.071)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Hispanic*ExpHarm	0.070	0.015	0.079**	0.007
	(0.062)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.034)
ExpDisc	-0.036	0.039	-0.078***	0.010
	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Black*ExpDisc	-0.023	0.018	-0.005	0.037
	(0.062)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Hispanic*ExpDisc	-0.012	0.021	0.046	0.050
	(0.060)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)
DG White P3	3.825	0.175	0.655	0.102
Black p-value	0.272	0.218	0.167	0.370
Hispanic p-value	0.113	0.877	0.337	0.202
Clusters	619	619	619	619
Observations	1857	1857	1857	1857

Mirrors Black P2 results:

- Strong ingroup bias
- BDG reduces transfers
- Higher kind behavior towards Hispanics under BDG
- Priming increases narrow ingroup bias (not shown here)

Injunctive Norms: Robustness, Comprehension, and Demographics

Norms

	(1) All decisions	(2) First decisions	(3) Comprehending sample	(4) Voting Democrat	(5) Voting Republican	(6) Low income	(7) High income
Very kind	0.129***	0.159***	0.154***	0.179***	0.109	0.197***	0.110***
	(0.022)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.094)	(0.048)	(0.034)
Kind	0.146***	0.273***	0.285***	0.344***	0.251***	0.178***	0.157***
	(0.023)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.064)	(0.086)	(0.048)	(0.034)
Default	0.042*	0.252***	0.281***	0.323***	0.155*	0.096*	0.042
	(0.025)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.086)	(0.057)	(0.034)
Costless nasty	0.079***	0.396***	0.412***	0.389***	0.442***	0.215***	0.071**
	(0.025)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.086)	(0.058)	(0.034)
Costly nasty	0.001	0.332***	0.352***	0.287***	0.430***	0.125**	-0.003
	(0.027)	(0.052)	(0.062)	(0.081)	(0.091)	(0.062)	(0.037)
Very nasty	-0.118***	0.063	0.089	-0.026	0.222**	0.000	-0.132***
	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.078)	(0.091)	(0.053)	(0.038)
N	2000	1000	717	418	288	554	1083

Bystander Dilemma Game: P1 kind behavior

Design

Option 1

This is what Person B could have done.

Person B

your payoff	Person A's payoff	Person B's payoff
?		
You will now decide about your and Person A's payoff.		

Option 2

This is what Person B could have done.

Person B

your payoff	Person A's payoff	Person B's payoff
?		
You will now decide about your and Person A's payoff.		

Bystander Dilemma Game: P1 kind behavior

Design

Name	Fair allocator (Player 1)	Bystander (Player 2)	Passive (Player 3)
Kind (or selfish)	5.0	5.0	5.0
Costly nasty	5.0	4.5	3.5

Table 2: Options available to Player 2 following Player 1 "Kind"

- **Kind option**: maintains efficiency, perfect equality.
- **Nasty option**: reduces efficiency, increases inequality.
- Order of options randomized at an individual level.

Behavior of Black P2s: P1 kind

Robustness

Table 3: Behavior of Black P2s, P1 Nice

	(1) Allocation b/se	(2) Kind b/se	(3) Nasty b/se
Black	0.091***	0.060***	-0.060***
	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Hispanic	0.009	0.006	-0.006
	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Bystander	0.053***	0.036***	-0.036***
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Black*Bystander	-0.034*	-0.023*	0.023*
	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Hispanic*Bystander	-0.002	-0.001	0.001
	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.013)
DG White P3	4.802	0.868	0.132
Clusters	4477	4477	4477
Observations	8954	8954	8954